The Three Futures
By Ahmad Faruqui, PhD
Dansville , CA
President Zardari’s last-minute decision to restore the Chief Justice prevented mayhem from breaking out on the streets. This would have happened if the Long March had proceeded to Islamabad. It was by far his wisest political decision.
But representing as it did a complete reversal of his prior position, it cut deep into his credibility and created new doubts about political stability in a country still reeling from the abrupt end of the Musharraf era. More than a year ago, the embattled general gave up his post as army chief in a last-bid attempt to hang on to the presidency. When that failed to pacify a restless populace, he stepped down.
Had he given the nation the true democracy that he promised he was planning to give it, the nation would have had a normal political succession and been spared the turmoil it is engulfed in today.
The restoration of the Chief Justice is no mean achievement. It may herald the creation of an independent judiciary. But before one can rejoice, one has to overcome the many near-term obstacles that stand in the way.
Just about every observer would agree that the political situation is fluid and pregnant with ambiguity. It will take a while to stabilize since the basic equilibrium of forces between the key players has been disturbed. Besides the omniscient (if not omnipotent) army, the players include the two major political parties – the PPP and the PML-N - the minor political parties such as the PML-Q (affectionately known not too long ago as the King’s Party), the ethnic MQM in urban Sindh and the secular ANP in the Frontier province.
These parties exercise their influence formally through the legislature but even more so by their ability to bring their supporters onto the streets. And then there is the rest of civil society consisting of the attorneys, grassroots political movements and the human rights organizations.
The wild card in the political equation, of course, is the amalgamation of terrorist groups which, besides the immediate damage they can inflict on the victims by their odious acts, have the potential for severely disrupting normal life in the entire country.
Given this backdrop, it is hard to know what lies ahead. One is reminded of Winston Churchill’s observation, “The future, though imminent, is obscure.” But enough is known to create the “bookends” and bound the possibilities. Three scenarios of the future can be envisaged.
Future I. The situation stabilizes in a few months. Zardari accepts the new political order, slips into political obscurity and eventually proceeds into exile. He is replaced by a person with no prior political experience but a person with a known face. The individual may be a writer or a poet or maybe even a scientist. The new president is happy to serve as the nominal head of state and has no political ambitions.
Prime Minister Gilani emerges as a key power broker in the new political alignment and the office of the prime minister becomes the most powerful political office in the country, representing a maturation of the political institutionalization process. He is able to muster enough votes in parliament to annul the rash of amendments conferring plenipotentiary powers on the president.
The Constitution of 1973, Z. A. Bhutto’s crowning lasting accomplishments, is restored. Under the restored Chief Justice, an independent judiciary begins to emerge. The separation of powers intrinsic in the Westminster model of governance falls into place. The army retreats to the barracks and adjusts to a new life, playing a purely military role under the direction of the civilian authority. The country, following a secular democratic path, finds itself back on the M. A. Jinnah Road.
Future II. The situation worsens and turmoil and instability return to the streets. Zardari attempts to get Gilani removed as the prime minister through a parliamentary subterfuge. He aligns himself with PML-Q and some of the minor parties and this new coalition attracts some dissenters from the PPP as well. It is able to garner enough votes to carry a vote of no confidence against Gilani in the National Assembly. A mess ensues as Gilani dissolves parliament and calls for new elections. A few months later, elections are held under army supervision. The PML-N returns to power with Nawaz Sharif as the Prime Minister. Gilani is given a senior ministerial appointment and the situation stabilizes. The army stays on the sidelines, ready to intervene if the situation deteriorates, but studiously neutral.
Future III. The political situation spirals out of control and the crowds, egged on by various political parties, spill out onto the streets. The economy grinds to a halt. Fearing a total meltdown, and with a wink from the Western powers, a reluctant army steps in and promises to hold new elections. But as the months progress, none are held.
No clear political leader emerges and the army is reluctant to pursue an electoral process with an uncertain outcome. The war against terror heats up, preventing a return to civilian rule. Opponents of military rule are arrested in large numbers. And the terrorists, empowered by military action that kills large numbers of civilians, spread fear and anarchy throughout the land. It seems like the Musharraf era, sans Musharraf, has returned.
Of these three futures, the first one represents an ideal outcome, the second one represents a likely outcome and the third one represents a horrible outcome that should be avoided at all cost.
Pakistan’s leaders have to learn to compromise and co-exist. They have to focus on the future and not try to relive past battles. The real enemy in the near term is the terrorist and in the long term it is poverty. But there is no getting to the long term without first living through the near term.
The terrorists cannot be defeated by the army nor can they be defeated by outsourcing the battle to the Americans. They can only be defeated by the people, who have to expunge terror from their hearts and minds.
To restore the rule of law, it was necessary to restore the Chief Justice. To ensure survival, it has become necessary to change the strategic culture of the country. This has to come from within. It cannot be imposed externally.
(The author is an associate of the Pakistan Security Research Unit at the University of Bradford. Faruqui@Pacbell.Net)
