Another Such Victory: Looking beyond Waziristan
By Dr. Mohammad Taqi
Florida
Another such victory over the Romans, and we are undone - Pyrrhus of Epirus Chaos is the word that best describes the conduct of the State in Pakistan's civil war. Media fanfare surrounding the Pakistan Army's incursion into and conquest of Kotkai - the hometown of the chief Taliban thug, Hakimullah Mehsud - sounded as if the Allies had descended upon the Führerbunker. Only, the Allies found a dead Führer inside; Mehsud remains at large.
Pakistan Army spokesman, Gen.Athar Abbas - celebrated as the ISPR edition of Saeed Sahaf by world media - has just about declared vic- tory in the South Waziristan opera- tion.
Accounts of F-16 fighter-jets and Cobra gunships taking out the enemy at will , are reminiscent of the US media declaring, within days of the US invasion of Afghanistan, that the Allied forces "after destroying the Taliban command and control structures, now have complete air- superiority over Afghanistan". Very true, indeed. Churchill had rightly observed that "the power of an air force is terrific when there is noth- ing to oppose it ".
However, when it comes to accounting for the Taliban lead- ers killed or captured in combat, the data is as elusive as the Taliban themselves.
Most of the Taliban leadership has reportedly been able to make its escape good, either to North Wa- ziristan, Orakzai, DI Khan or south towards the Pashtun parts of Balu- chistan.
There is still no word about the Taliban leaders from Swat, some of whom, by ISPR account, were wounded in the combat. Still others like the infamous Muslim Khan and Sufi Muhammad, who were captured alive, have not been brought to trial yet.
Another such figure is Commissioner Syed Muhammad Javed - the dubious central character of the Malakand disaster - who allegedly was involved in the murder of four Army commandos. He was set free a few days before the Waziristan operation started.
It is pertinent to note that all major Taliban leaders killed or injured from Nek Muhammad Wazir in 2004 down to Tahir Yaldoshov Uzbeki, a couple of weeks ago, have been targeted by the US Predator UAVs and not the Pakistan Army.
This is almost a replay of how Taliban melted away into the Afghan hinterland in face of the overwhelming US force, to regroup and fight another day. And fighting they are, with October being the bloodiest month thus far in eight years.
The guided tours of South Waziristan given to the media by the Army have raised more questions as to where did the Taliban go.
It is emerging that the Army may have captured the land but the Taliban leaders and cadres made a classic tactical retreat with their agile fighting capability intact.
The Army is not reducing the credibility gap between its actions and words by putting out its Goebbelese about victories while massive bombings rip through the heart of cities and citizens alike, as in Pesha war and Rawalpindi recently.
Indeed, known for its total con trol over Afghan and border policy, the Army has resorted to bringing in the PPP information minister, Qamar Zaman Kaira, for joint press briefings to gain some traction with the more cynical Western media.
This brings up an even more important question as to what is the civilian leadership thinking, if any thing at all?
The Prime Minister is on re cord to have talked about an "exit strategy" before he would support an Army operation Malakand. The man might have been watching a tad too much CNN and may not realize that when the US presidents use the term, they are talking about pulling out a foreign force from Iraq or Af ghanistan. A national army does not need an exit strategy in situations like the present war. It is supposed to clear, hold and help rebuild what were the Taliban infested areas.
At the height of anti-Soviet campaign, I had a chance to visit the Army compounds in Wana and Jandola in South Waziristan, Raz mak in North Waziristan and Landi Kotal in the Khyber Agency (at the last stop the CO had his men would proudly display the newly acquired Stinger missiles ). No military ge nius like Gilani was talking of an exit strategy back then. If there has to be an exit strategy for Army to leave the civilian areas, why stop at the FATA and Malakand? Why not vacate the prime real estate in every major Pakistani city too?
The illustrious interior minister of Pakistan has not been able to make up his mind whether he wants to pin the blame on the Indo-Zionist nexus or the anti-NRO crowd.
And when was the last time we heard from - the largely ceremonial ¬ office of the defense minister?
Now add to this mix the perpetually MIA, Asfandyar Wali Khan, who is supposed to be the figurehead of the Pashtun resistance to Talibanization. At one point it was easier for the media and the ANP members to reach Muslim Khan by phone, than contacting the chief of the ruling party in NWFP. It is still hard to decide whether it is Hakimullah Mehsud who is more difficult to trace or is it the great Khan.
Of course one doesn't expect, due to security precautions, for Asfandyar Khan to lead processions in the bazaars of Peshawar, but is it too much to ask for him to appear on the television to console the war-ravaged Pashtuns and Peshawaris, and try to inspire some confidence in them. After all, Altaf Hussain of the MQM has been successfully doing so for more than a decade.
The PML-N leaders have been riding the fence and avoid clearly condemning the Taliban and suicide bombings. However, by absenting himself from the Army Chief 's briefing to the senior politicians and party heads, Mian Nawaz Sharif has contributed big-time to the ambivalence that exists within his party about how to tackle the Taliban menace.
Battle for Pakistan could not be complete for either side without securing Punjab. The nightmare scenario of terrorism unleashed from the hornet's nest that is Southern Punjab is already unraveling.
When Kabul was under attack in 1990-92 many in Peshawar believed that the madness would somehow stop at Torkhum. The PML-N leaders have maintained a fairly similar attitude towards the happenings in NWFP and FATA.
The Jihadist partisans like Imran Khan and JI's Munawwar Hassan remain consistent in laying all the blame at the doorsteps of the USA and lump it together with the good old India and Israel.
The sum-total of all this is a massive confusion unleashed on the common man by the half-baked journalists, obscurantist TV anchors and outright Jihadis masquerading as media-men.
It is impossible for an ordinary citizen to sift through the barrage of conspiracy theories, analyze the actions or inaction of security forces and the jumbled message from the civilian leadership, and then makeup his mind and plans to guard his house, mohallah and shop against an enemy that has no distinctive characteristics.
We noted in these pages, several months ago, that prosecuting a war requires a sound civilian leadership overseeing the army effort through a war cabinet comprising of the prime minister, interior and defense ministers, relevant provincial governors and chief ministers along with the Army and ISI chiefs and the director general military operations. It would be preferable if the PML-N chief is also co-opted into it.
This indeed sounds utopian at a time when the politicians are bickering about the NRO and Kerry-Lugar Law, but it perhaps remains the only way forward. One doesn't need an exit strategy but rather a superior political strategy in counter-terrorism and deterring terror.
The message to counter Jihadis has to come from the civilian leadership and it has to be concise, consistent and repeated frequently and visibly by the president, prime-minister, key opposition leaders and the Pashtun leadership.
No Taliban leader has been brought to justice so far. The sporadic reports of extra-judicial killings of Taliban in Malakand are anything but encouraging.
Whereas a full-scale war crimes tribunal may need to be set up towards the end of war, there certainly is a need for setting up tribunals now to prosecute and bring to justice the captured Taliban.
In civil wars perception is everything and the perception of weak, fractured and clueless political leadership will perpetuate the Taliban violence and ghost victories like in Malakand and South Waziristan.
Punjab is the next front in this war and we cannot afford another such victory there.
(The author teaches and practices medicine at the University of Florida and can be reached at mazdaki@me.com )
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