New Sanctions against Iran: Old Dilemma for the West
By Syed Muazzem Ali
Former Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh
San Diego , CA
After months of intense behind-the-scene diplomatic negotiations and haggling, the UN Security Council finally adopted the Washington–sponsored sanction resolution against Iran with 12 in favor, 2 against ( Turkey and Brazil) and one abstention ( Lebanon). The Obama Administration has claimed that the resolution adopted by the Council was the toughest against any country’s financial and military interests, and that it marks the emergence of a global consensus against Tehran’s bid to develop nuclear weapons.
The Administration’s claim is partly true as the resolution bans the country from investing in uranium mining, pursuing ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, or purchasing eight other broad categories of heavy weapons from abroad. It also imposes sanctions such as an asset freeze on 40 Iranian companies, organizing and shipping lines, and calls on countries to cooperate in cargo inspections when presented with reasonable grounds to suspect materials for the Iranian nuclear weapon program.
However, these are not the “crippling sanctions” that the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had promised a year ago. While the Administration is underscoring the importance of Russian and Chinese support for the sanctions, their votes have come at the cost of watering down the resolution. Many of the provisions in the Security Council resolution are essentially optional and not binding.
The main thrust of the American initiative was to sharply curtail foreign financial services available to the Islamic Revolutionary Regime and its state and private enterprises. Yet, what was adopted last week calls on, rather than requires, countries to block financial transactions that could contribute to Iranian nuclear program, and the outcome of such provision would be, at best, uneven. More importantly, it does not, in any way, limit Tehran’s ability to produce and export oil abroad which accounts for nearly three-fourths of the country’s revenues; nor does it impede normal trade that might affect Iran’s or its main trading allies’ economic interests.
The sanction bans the sale of many heavy and lethal weapons to Iran; nevertheless countries would be still free to sell deadly weapons outside those broad categories. As some analysts have pointed out, Russia would still be free to export sophisticated S-300 antiaircraft missiles which have been a source of concern to Washington. Not surprisingly, former President Bush’s foreign policy aides have dismissed the resolution saying that the “ United States is not going to get anything approaching universal compliance with these optional sanctions”.
The resentment against the Islamic revolutionary regime runs so deep and wide in the US that even the Congress has been pressing for a more stringent resolution against the regime in Tehran, including the provision to penalize foreign companies for doing business with Iran especially in the petroleum and military fields. The Obama administration knows well that such unilateral and national sanction would alienate Russia, China and the allies, and make the resolution even more ineffective.
Incidentally, China and Russia have already signaled their opposition to imposition of any further bilateral sanctions affecting Iran’s economy and trade. The Russian Foreign Minister reminded last week their opposition to any national level sanctions to punish foreign companies. The Obama Administration would, therefore, like to give more flexibility to the US Treasury Department before taking any punitive action against any foreign company.
The adoption of the Security Council resolution largely signals cancellation of the nuclear swap deal which was brokered by Brazil-Turkey a few weeks ago. Expectedly, Brazil and Turkey voted against the resolution and Washington will have to clear the “misunderstanding” with these two close allies. After the adoption of the sanction resolution, the five Permanent Council Members, however, have indicated that they would be “keeping the door open” for further negotiations with Iran.
Iran has been facing various forms of military and economic sanctions since the Islamic Revolutionary regime took over three decades ago. This time they tried to stave off adoption of any new sanctions through frantic diplomatic initiatives and the Brazil-Turkey effort was a great relief to them.
However, Washington struck back and now that the Council has adopted the sanction resolution, the regime in Tehran will once again be on the defensive. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, expectedly, rejected the sanction as “worthless”. The Western political circle is closely watching how these new sanctions play out in Iran at this time of political discontent. It is noteworthy that, in the past, the fiercely nationalist Iranians have tended to put aside their differences, and support the Government on national issues.
The dilemma before the US and the major Western powers is how to resume dialogue with belligerent Iran. Surely it will be very difficult under the present tense circumstances, but the alternatives are even grimmer. On the one hand, military strikes against Iran are untenable, and on the other, emergence of a nuclear Iran will further destabilize the region. Thus, once the dust settles down, engagement with Iran has to be resumed, and attempts made to persuade them to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and comply with safeguards as provided under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) with a view to demonstrating that they are limiting their nuclear program to peaceful purposes only. This is a tall order, and only time will tell how far the Western powers can succeed.
[The author is a former Foreign Secretary and Ambassador of Bangladesh, who served as Ambassador to Iran in 1995-98. He currently resides in California]
