AfPak: A Series of Unfortunate Events — II
By Dr Mohammad Taqi
Florida
We have heard a lot about the perception of the so-called Pakistani elite vis-à-vis the endgame in Afghanistan. I thought it might be worthwhile to elicit opinion from the Afghans about their perception of the Pakistani elite and its designs on Afghanistan. Abbas Daiyar, a researcher and member of the editorial board of Daily Outlook Kabul, Afghanistan wrote:
“Sherry Rehman is indeed an articulate advocate of minority rights, women empowerment and a liberal voice on domestic affairs in Pakistan. But her foreign policy views, particularly regarding Afghanistan and India, are not very different from that of the (Pakistani) military establishment’s. Her appointment as a consensus candidate for both the civilian government in Islamabad and the military establishment in Rawalpindi shows the fact that it is a long way for the civilians in Pakistan to take charge of foreign policy affairs.
“A recent report produced by the Jinnah Institute (JI), founded and headed (until recently) by Sherry Rehman, presented the ‘strategic depth’ policy of Pakistani military in Afghanistan as ‘India-centric’. The report dubbed as Pakistan’s foreign policy elite’s perception regarding the endgame in Afghanistan was (exactly) what the GHQ wants. Ms Rehman would project the same views in Washington as ambassador. Former ambassador, Husain Haqqani, has openly said that he had differences with the military establishment’s ‘strategic depth’ policy in Afghanistan. Most importantly, with his resignation from the post, a strong voice for civilian control in Pakistani foreign policy affairs has been removed. We in Afghanistan are disappointed with Haqqani’s removal as much as the supporters of civilian supremacy in Pakistan.”
Abbas Daiyar has cogently summarized the predicament that all those desirous of peace in Afghanistan, and Pakistan, find themselves in. After a series of unfortunate events hitting the Pak-Afghan region culminated in Pakistan boycotting the Bonn Conference, the civilian leadership in Pakistan has barely been able to keep its head above water. The civil-military balance — if there was any — in Pakistan has shifted dramatically in favor of its armed forces, which have always had a chokehold on the country’s foreign policy. The saber rattling by the Pakistani brass and its choirboys in the aftermath of the unfortunate NATO incursion in Mohmand Agency indicates that the junta is unwilling to let go of its so-called strategic depth policy regarding Afghanistan. In pursuit of this strategic depth, the Pakistani security establishment and its fellow travelers continue to bid on the Taliban and project them as the ‘legitimate’ representatives of the Pashtun Afghans. Unfortunately, some seasoned analysts too have not been able to avoid this pitfall. In his recent television show, senior analyst Mr Najam Sethi made a similar claim that the Afghan Taliban represents the Pashtuns of that country. Some survey numbers attributed to the pollster James Zogby corroborating this claim were also floated on the social media. At the time of this writing, the media contact person at Zogby International had not returned my call.
My fellow-columnist, Farhat Taj, has already written a detailed piece last week, deconstructing Mr Sethi’s assertion. Many Afghans also took serious umbrage at his proclamation that equated the Taliban with the Pashtuns. Perhaps a serious disconnect exists between even the seemingly well-meaning people and the ground realities in Afghanistan. And talking of polls, it is imperative to share a few salient findings of the broadest and most comprehensive poll yet conducted in Afghanistan.
On November 15, 2011, the California-based Asia Foundation (AF) announced the results of its Afghanistan poll, conducted in all 34 provinces and including 6,348 respondents (funding support provided by USAID). Suffice it to say that the Asia Foundation poll shatters the myth of the Taliban being a ‘popular resistance movement’ or ‘representatives’ of the Pashtun Afghans.
A key finding of the AF survey was that the support for the Taliban inside Afghanistan is at an all-time low. A mere 29 percent people sympathize (not support) with the Taliban compared with a 64 percent population that has no sympathy for the militants. Another 11 percent had some level of sympathy for the Taliban. In the urban centers, 74 percent of the respondents reported no such sympathy while 61 percent of rural Afghanistan disowned the Taliban. The majority of all ethnic groups have no sympathy for the Taliban. The proportion of those with some sympathy for militancy was 37 percent Pashtuns, 30 percent Uzbeks and 32 percent other ethnicities. The presence of foreign troops was not a major reason for sympathizing with the Taliban.
The most promising finding was that nearly half of the respondents (46 percent) said that Afghanistan was moving in the right direction, while 35 percent (a higher proportion than before) did not share this optimism. The poll recorded the highest level of satisfaction with basic services like health, education and water, since 2004. Some 43 percent people saw improvement in the financial wellbeing of their households. The most important findings relevant to the so-called endgame were that 38 percent people saw insecurity and terrorism as the biggest threat to these gains while 82 percent people approved efforts for reconciliation.
After getting rid of Ambassador Husain Haqqani through media lynching and coercing the civilian government, the Pakistani establishment and its media allies feel that in the post-Mohmand phase they have gained leverage on the US. But by cutting off the NATO supply lines and boycotting the Bonn Conference, Pakistan has actually exposed the extent of its leverage while effectively turning its back on the world. And in this isolation the Taliban join it, of course. The only options left after diplomatic leverage is maxed out are escalating proxy war or scaling back the rhetoric.
As the dust settles on the Pakistan-NATO tiff and the Bonn Conference, the only thing that will emerge conclusively is that the Pakistani and the US interests in Afghanistan remain critically divergent and potential for reconciliation slim. But even more important is the fact that in its perception of the endgame in Afghanistan, the so-called Pakistani elite is at loggerheads with the Afghans and the rest of the world.
For the Afghans, the Taliban are neither the representatives of the Pashtuns nor torchbearers of peace. The Pakistani foreign policy elite must stop projecting terrorists as peacemakers lest they intend to unleash another series of unfortunate events in the region just like the 1990s. (Concluded)
The writer can be reached at mazdaki@me.com. He tweets at http://twitter.com/mazdaki
