Getting beyond the Trust Deficit
By Dr Adil Najam
Lahore, Pakistan
Writing in these very pages back in September of 2005 (‘What Americans think of Pakistan’), I had recounted how an American scholar affiliated with a Washington think tank had asked me what Pakistanis think of America. I had pondered, also, on the flip version of the question, as contained in the article headline.
Four years later, in October of 2009 (‘US-Pakistan: A tortured relationship’), I had returned to the two questions and repeated the suggestion that the answer to both is the same: “They think of you exactly what you think of them. They don’t really like you, they certainly don’t trust you, but right now they think they need you.” This is what Americans think of Pakistan. And this is what Pakistanis think of America. In this regard, at least, it is a very equal and reciprocal relationship.
Today, as if on cue to maintain the four-year cycle, seems like a good time to return, yet again, to the very same questions. The context may have become even more confounding, but the answer is no different.
Fissures are deeper. No wounds have been healed. Distrust continues to define a relationship that each side is equally weary of. Even while occasions like Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s recent meeting with President Barack Obama give both countries an opportunity to masquerade as the ‘closet friends’ that some have called them, cynics on both sides are left wondering why anyone would need enemies when they have friends like these. Yet, neither is willing, able, or desirous of letting go of the other. This may well be the single most messed up relationship in all of international affairs today.
The nature of the trust deficit that makes it so is now well-recognized. Let me merely quote a few excerpts from my 2005 article to restate the argument: “Each considers the other to be unreliable, but useful. Each country has the sensibility of a jilted lover when it comes to this particular relationship. Like couples bickering at the precipice of divorce, each feels that it deserves to be treated better. The problem is compounded when one side (the US) is quite comfortable with an instrumental relationship, while the other (Pakistan) deems mere instrumentality to be an insult. From a Pakistani perspective, America has repeatedly failed to be a good friend. From an American viewpoint, Pakistan has consistently failed to deliver on its promises.”
Important as it is to understand the nature of the all-too-real trust deficit between Pakistan and USA, it is far more important to figure out what can be done to get beyond the trust deficit. Let me suggest that there are things that can be done. Although, none that are easy.
Maybe most important of these things is for both sides to recognize the need to bridge the trust deficit. Proforma as it may sound, it is anything but. It is easy to proclaim that we do not trust the other. It is far from easy to recognize that we are not trusted by the other. It is outright painful to acknowledge that our own actions have been less than trustworthy. Unfortunately, counseling works much better for fragile marriages than it does for international relationships. Fortunately, a number of practical steps can be taken without waiting for the platonic alignment to be cemented.
Among such practical steps, nothing is more useful than regular dialogue. Strategic dialogue would be great, but at least maintain regularity in dialogue. On the military-to-military side the two countries have developed relatively better channels of communication than they have been able to do on the civilian side. It is for this reason that it was good that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and President Barack Obama were able to finally meet in Washington. It is even better that Pakistan has finally announced an ambassador to Washington. The prolonged absence of regular conduits of communication is never a good sign for a troubled relationship.
On the more difficult challenge of (re-)building trustworthiness and dependability, it is not at all clear that the US has fully comprehended the intensity of the feelings of let-down that Pakistanis have. This has been more recently exemplified by incidents such as Raymond Davis and Salala but is rooted most deeply in the disappearing act that the US pulled in the region right after the Soviet departure from Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the US has adopted a blatant PR approach to the problem.
Highlighting one’s contributions is an obvious strategy, but it takes much more than an advertising blitz to do so. Sometimes, it takes less. Having a large aid program is clearly an advantage, but belabored procedures and staff that keep ramming in the ‘political’ elements into its implementation – even if inadvertently – can only backfire. In too many cases in Pakistan, it has. Sadly, this results not only in ineffective politics but also ineffective development.
For Pakistan, the challenge of credibility is internal. It is a dangerous situation when the paranoia of external interference becomes so high that one feels compelled to cut off one’s own nose to spite the face. Let us take the most pertinent of examples: terrorism. Nothing will increase Pakistan’s international credibility more – not only with the US but with the entire comity of nations – than unambiguous, effective, and consistent action against terrorism. Yet, international credibility is the least important reason for Pakistan to act.
The most important – the only – reason for Pakistan to act is that all acts of terrorism whether done on or from Pakistan are an attack on Pakistan itself. Pakistan should be taking the strongest action against terrorism – and seen to be doing so – simply because there can possibly be no greater duty of the state than to deal with that which makes its citizens and its society insecure. If Pakistan were to do so, it would find its international credibility immediately restored and immensely enhanced.
Of course, drone attacks into Pakistani territory have become the great lightening rod in today’s US-Pakistan relations. There are too many good reasons for why drone warfare is a bad – a very bad – idea. They kill innocent civilians. They further dehumanize the most dehumanized of human activity: war. They are an infringement of international law and sovereignty. They set a truly horrendous precedent. One hopes that international, domestic and Pakistan-based pressure will help the US realize the terrible folly of this device. If the Pakistan authorities have been complicit in their use then that complicity must stop.
Having said all of the above, drones must also not become a distraction from the tough actions that Pakistan has itself delayed, especially – but not solely – in North and South Waziristan. That a US drone can come into Pakistani airspace and (sometimes) kill a militant is not the only way in which Pakistan’s sovereignty and security is breached. The fact that militants – enemies of the Pakistan state and society – are able to operate in and from Pakistan territory is as great a breach of Pakistan sovereignty and security. Maybe greater. Credibility demands that Pakistan acts against both.
It should not be a surprise to anyone that there are no simple road maps to fix the trust deficit. We got into this mess one mistake at a time. We will get out of it one small step in the right direction at a time. One has only identified a few of those many steps needed. There are no quick-fixes; no easy-fixes. But, maybe a good place to start is for each country to worry a little less about how the other has been untrustworthy in the past and a little more about demonstrating that they themselves can be more trustworthy in the future.
