Beyond General Kayani
By Dr Mohammad Taqi
Florida
The Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani did the right thing, albeit three years late. After accepting an additional three-year term back in 2010 the general has opted to hang his hat up, putting an end to the speculations about yet another extension. The political forces might have gone along with extending his term again but General Kayani’s own outfit did not appear too keen to get him one. The promotions stoppage issues, concerns about the overall morale and a palpable fissure within the army between the ‘tradionalist’ and the rather adventurist camp a la the ISI, all nudged the general towards making the right decision this time around.
While the civilians did not give General Kayani and the army under him the 1988-style Tamgha-e-Jamhuriat or the Medal of Democracy this time around, plenty of paeans are being sung to thank him for not toppling a democratic dispensation. Well, great that he did not send the civilian government that took charge after nine years of army rule, but could he really? Most likely not, given the way domestic and international geopolitical stars have been aligned over the last several years. General Kayani did, however, cross swords with the last government led by the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), on several major issues and quite openly so in some of those instances. He gave the PPP an early jolt when the party tried to bring the ISI under civilian control through a half-baked measure in 2008. His displeasure and opposition to the terms, as negotiated by the PPP, of the 2009 Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act overseeing the United States aid to Pakistan was another blow to the PPP. And finally he really shook the PPP big time in the so-called Memogate showdown in 2011 in which the superior judiciary also piled up on the government. The Memogate encounter had the potential to bring everything crumbling down were it not for the sheer grit of the then president Asif Zardari and the former ambassador Husain Haqqani. We had noted in this space then that if the civvies stuck together the army would wink, and it did. Unless an earth-shattering event takes place the next army chief will not be able to pull off a Musharraf, Zia or even a Kayani on democracy. About time the civilians started giving themselves a tad more credit for sustaining democracy.
General Ashfaq Kayani also oversaw the Afghan insurgents of three varieties, i.e. the Taliban of Mullah Omar, the Jalaluddin Haqqani terrorist network (HQN) and Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin Hekmatyar faction (HIG) consolidate their bases in Pakistan and operate with impunity across the Durand Line. On the domestic front the arbitrary distinction between the so-called good versus bad Taliban became the de facto Pakistani policy to deal with assorted jihadists including the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), on General Kayani’s watch. The general’s mantra of late has been to speak of the preeminent threat to Pakistan being from the domestic terrorist forces. But a closer look shows Pakistan army not only tolerating a variety of jihadists in the tribal areas, coexisting with them in various areas like the North Waziristan Agency (NWA) but also maintaining agreements with various terrorist groups. General Kayani upheld Pakistan’s deals — conducted under army’s auspices — with the domestic Taliban factions such as the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group in the NWA and the Maulvi Nazir group in South Waziristan. Nazir was taken out in a US drone attack but the deal still holds. A slew of military operations were conducted during General Kayani’s tenure and success claimed with fanfare at the time. But despite the proclaimed clearance of six out of seven tribal agencies by the army, those areas remain a perilous terrain for almost everyone and thousands of native Pashtuns are still displaced from their homes.
The Musharraf era duplicitous policy of joining the fight against the al Qaeda and their hosts Taliban while lamenting drone attacks that kill these very terrorists holed up on Pakistani soil continued throughout General Kayani’s stint. The India-oriented Punjab-based jihadist proxies of the army featured prominently in the cast of characters protesting the drone strikes. An interesting but sad milieu has existed in the NWA for almost a decade now where the bad Taliban consort freely with the good Taliban and both intermingle and share logistics with the al Qaeda affiliated HQN. The 2010 al Qaeda-TTP joint operation, blessed by the HQN, against the CIA’s Forward Operating Base Chapman in Khost, Afghanistan, killing seven CIA personnel, best represents the deadly end-product of the jihadist enterprise running in the NWA while the army under General Kayani has watched from across the street. Almost every other terrorist attack whether inside Pakistan or abroad has been tied to the jihadists’ lair in the NWA against which General Kayani has steadfastly refused to act for years.
As General Kayani’s successor is being shortlisted the question is also popping up whether he will be able or inclined to change course. Chances are slim to none that the new army chief will make any drastic changes off the bat. The army has always acted as a monolith even if there is some dissent internally, which perhaps is the current situation. Additionally, the army has put all its eggs in the Taliban-HQN-HIG basket as far as the post-US withdrawal scenario in Afghanistan goes. Army’s handling of the TTP is also tied to the outcome of the bets it has made in Afghanistan. The TTP on its part has already made maximalist demands, backed by unrelenting terrorist assaults and is also playing up its ties to the Afghan Taliban, while the state virtually begs it for peace. Contrary to the army’s expectation the TTP’s will be buoyed by any Taliban gains in Afghanistan. General Kayani may have secured Pakistan a pyrrhic victory in Afghanistan. It would take a herculean effort on the part of his successor to extricate the army, and Pakistan, from the mess it has gotten everyone into. He would need robust civilian help for a serious course correction to avert the iceberg of the so-called Afghan ‘endgame’, which the Pakistani Titanic may otherwise hit.
One would be remiss to not recall General Kayani’s recent claim that ‘not a single soldier was engaged in the army operation’ in Balochistan. Those showering unqualified praise on General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and even talking of bestowing some other office on him may also wish to spare a thought about the thousands of Baloch abducted, killed and dumped over the last several years. Mutilated Baloch corpses are a sordid legacy that General Kayani leaves behind.
(The writer can be reached at mazdaki@me.com and he tweets @mazdaki)
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