Civilizational Renewal (Part 1 of 4)
By Professor Nazeer Ahmed
Conncord, CA
“Verily, Allah does not love the extremists” (The Qur’an, 5: 87)
Summary: This essay takes an historical look at the occasional rise of extremism in the fourteen hundred years of Islamic history. The objective is to sift through and identify the factors that are common to the extremist movements of the past and the present. The perspective is from the inside looking out. External influences that fan the flames of discord and are perhaps crucial are touched upon only briefly to provide a context for analysis. It is posited that the rise of fanatical extremism in the modern era and the concurrent rise of virulent Islamophopia offer unique opportunities for civilizational renewal of Islam based on the pristine, universal, loving message of the Qur’an and the Seerah (path, methodology) of Prophet Muhammed (pbuh).
Vaulting across two continents, I am constantly pressed to explain the current phenomenon which pops up like an ugly ghost lurking behind every conversation. Whether you are making a presentation to an interfaith group in San Francisco or talking to a taxi driver in Bangalore, the conversation drifts towards this subject like a rolling ball on an inclined plane speeding towards a muddy pit at the bottom.
The banality of the show provides daily ammunition for the unending diatribes of Islamophobes and muffles the voices of those who seek to defend their faith.
The response of Muslim scholars to this phenomenon follows the usual pattern of hand wringing, distancing, denial and condemnation. While the response is understandable, it is clearly not enough. What is at stake is not just the outcome of an event but a challenge to the very essence of Islam as a faith.
I have watched with interest the steady rise of Islamophobia in the western media over the last fifty years. Until the Second World War, the image of a Muslim, as it was crafted by Hollywood movies, was that of an amorous Arab in long, flowing robes whose love for swift horses was exceeded only by his attraction to white European women. Then came the tragedy of Palestine and the focus shifted to the Palestinians. Gradually, it morphed into disdain for all Arabs. In the 1970s, the net extended further to include all Muslims. In the 1990s, as the neocons gained ascendancy in America, the animosity transcended region and race. The Islamophobes went for the jugular and took direct aim at the sources of faith, namely, the Qur’an and the person of Prophet Muhammed (pbuh).
The issues, therefore, transcend ISIS which is a passing phenomenon that will move on like a transient shadow on the canvas of history. It will be contained and extirpated. The issues touch upon the very foundations of the Islamic faith.
The modern era is an historical occasion, a bend in history that has the potential to shape the destiny of the Islamic world, indeed of the world at large. An historical occasion calls for a civilizational response to a global challenge, one that shapes the future of humankind and guides it towards its transcendent destiny, namely, to rise up to the divine honor of servanthood.
History is a divine Sign. In the words of Ibn Khaldun (1332- 1406 CE), the father of historiography, history is a useful science which teaches us the struggles of the generations bygone so that we can learn from them and chart our course for the future. A brief study of the history of extremism falls into this category.
The khwarij (seventh century) and the assassins (eleventh century) are offered in this essay as examples of early extremist movements. The development of modern day extremism is traced over the last four hundred years. The triumph of spiritual Islam in the post-Mongol thirteenth century is provided as a counterpoint to extremist movements and as an alternate methodology for a civilizational response to the current Islamophobic barrage.
The Rise of the Khwarij (676 CE)
The Khwarij arose out of the convulsions of the early civil wars. The assassination of the third Caliph Uthman (r) in 676 set off a political storm that rent the Islamic community apart. I have covered in some depth the events surrounding this tragedy in the Encyclopedia of Islamic History ( www.historyofislam.com ). The narratives are summarized here to provide a context for our observations.
Most Muslim chroniclers have shied away from examining the early civil wars citing the honor and respect that is due to all Companions of the Prophet. Yet others have maintained that the ijtihad (legal reasoning) of both Ali (r) and Muawiya (r) was correct but that of Ali (r) was of a higher order than that of Muawiya (r). We take no position regarding the issue (we will scrupulously avoid the issue of hakam) except to cite the historical facts as they unfolded. Ali (r), whom the Prophet had called “gateway to my knowledge”, was a fountainhead of spirituality, a man of principle, a great scholar, a noble soldier, but was caught up in the political storms generated by the Caliphate of Uthman (r) and his assassination. Muawiya (r) was an accomplished administrator, a superb politician and a determined foe. The two proved to be true to their positions till the end of their lives. Ali (r), as the legitimate Caliph, desired to establish order first and then attend to other matters of state.
Upon assuming the Caliphate, Ali (r) wrote to the governors of all the provinces in the far flung Caliphate asking them for their resignation so that new governors might be appointed. Most complied but the response from Muawiya (r), the governor of Syria, was a blank envelope. He demanded qisas (justice for the assassination of Uthman (r)) first, before he would accept the Caliphate of Ali (r).
On his part, Ali (r) moved the capital of the Caliphate from Madina to Kufa (656) and raised an army of 80,000 for the march on Syria. This army was mostly composed of Iraqis, with contingents of Madinites and Persians. Seeing the storms gathering on the horizon, some notable Companions tried to make peace. Abu Muslim Khorasani (r) convinced Muawiya (r) to write to Ali (r). In his letter, Muawiya (r) offered to take his oath of fealty to Ali (r) if he surrendered the assassins of Uthman (r). But by now positions had hardened on both sides. When Ali (r) raised the issue before a large gathering at the mosque in Kufa, over 10,000 Iraqis raised their hands and declared that each of them was an assassin of Uthman (r). The messenger from Syria returned empty handed.
Muawiya (r) raised an army of 70,000 in Syria and marched towards Iraq, The two armies met on the plains of Siffin and then collided.
For a long time, the battle was a stalemate with neither side gaining a decisive advantage. But on the night of Laitul-Hareer (the Night of the Battle), the supporters of Ali (r) attacked with such determined force that the Syrians realized they were on the verge of defeat. It was here that Muawiya (r) played one more ruse. Upon the advice of Amr bin al As (r) , to whom Muawiya (r) had promised the governorship of Egypt, the Syrians hoisted copies of the Qur’an on their lances and declared that they would accept the hakam (arbitration) of the Qur’an between the contesting parties. Ali (r) saw through this ruse but was helpless in the face of the determined demands from both sides.
This was one more of the fateful decisions for Caliph Ali (r). The acceptance of arbitration established Muawiya (r) as a legitimate contender for power with Ali (r). The two sides established a tribunal of two persons, one from each party, to decide between Muawiya (r) and Ali (r). Abu Musa Aashari (r), a pious elderly Companion of the Prophet, was selected to represent Ali (r). Amr bin al As (r), an avowed partisan, was the representative for Muawiya (r).
It was at this juncture that a group from Ali’s (r) army walked away. They were called the Al Khwarij (also called the Kharijites). The Kharijites were furious because in their view, Caliph Ali ibn Abu Talib (r) had committed shirk by accepting the arbitration of men as opposed to the hakam (arbitration) of the Qur’an. And unless he repented, they vowed to oppose Ali (r).
This was a classic illustration of how the transcendence of divine revelation is compromised when people of limited understanding apply it in mundane affairs. The Khwarij (literally, those who walked away) juxtaposed two ayahs from the Qur’an and sought legitimacy for their ruthless activities. Initially, they forced Ali (r) to accept arbitration on the basis of the Ayah: “If any do fail to judge by what God has revealed, they are wrongdoers” (Qur’an, 5:47). Then they walked away when a tribunal was appointed, basing their position on another Ayah: “Yet those who reject faith hold (others) as equal with their Lord.” (Qur’an, 6:1). It was their position that the Qur’an alone was the arbitrator; the arbitration of men was not acceptable.
Legitimacy in Islam flows from the Qur’an. Throughout Islamic history, the protagonists of the major intellectual and political upheavals have sought their justification in divine revelation. The extremist Khwarij were no exception; they were the first ones to do so. This is a major lesson from the civil wars that rent asunder the early Islamic community.
The arbitrators decided that both Ali (r) and Muawiya (r) were to resign and that a replacement was to be elected by the community. When it was time to make this announcement public, another trick was played. Abu Musa Aashari (r) was asked to speak first and he faithfully announced the joint decision. But when Amr bin al As (r) followed, he changed the story. ”O people, you have heard the decision of Abu Musa. He has deposed his own man and now I too depose him. But I do not depose my own man Muawiya. He is the inheritor of Emir ul Momineen Uthman and wants lawful revenge for his blood. Therefore, he is more entitled to take the seat of the late Caliph”. There was pandemonium in the gathering. Accusations flew. But it was too late. When news of this episode reached Ali (r), he was sad. Amr bin al As (r) returned to Damascus where Muawiya (r) was declared the Caliph (658). Thus it was that during the years 658-661, there were two centers of Caliphate, one in Kufa and the other in Damascus.
This subterfuge was unacceptable to followers of Ali (r) and the war resumed. For three years various provinces were contested between Muawiya (r) and Ali (r), including Madina, Mecca, Jazira, Anbar, Madain, Badya, Waqusa, Talbia, Qataqtana, Doumatul Jandal and Tadammur. At long last both sides seemed to have tired and a truce was declared in 660 CE. Under the terms, Ali (r) retained control of Mecca, Madina, Iraq, Persia and the provinces to the east. Muawiya (r) retained control over Syria and Egypt.
The de-facto partition re-established the historic geopolitical boundary between Byzantium and Persia at the borders of the Euphrates. Byzantium belonged to the Mediterranean and Europe while Persia belonged to Asia. Through the centuries, this boundary was re-affirmed by many of the Caliphs and sultans, so much so that the historical experience of the Persians, Central Asians, Indians and Pakistanis of today is significantly different from the historical experience of Syrians, Jordanians, Lebanese, Egyptians and North Africans. Syria and Egypt did not accept the Caliphate of Ali (r) until the Abbasid period (750 CE), whereas Ali (r) was for all times the Caliph, the “Lion of God”, the teacher and mentor for Persians and Persianized Muslims in the east.
The Khawarij, the first extremist sect in Islamic history, were not content to walk away from Ali (r). They sought to alter the political landscape through assassination, murder and mayhem and resolved to simultaneously assassinate Ali (r), Muawiya (r) and Amr bin al As (r), blaming these three for the civil wars. As fate would have it, the assassination of Ali (r) was successful. Muawiya (r) escaped with a minor wound. Amr bin al As (r) did not show up for prayer on the day he was to be assassinated and his designee was killed in his place. Ali ibn Abu Talib (r), the Fourth of the Khulafa e Rashidoon, died on the 20 th of Ramadan, in the year 661 CE.
The eleventh century witnessed the rise of another extremist group, the assassins, who were a byproduct of the political and military struggles between the Sunni Abbasids based in Baghdad and the Shia Fatimids based in Cairo. Around the turn of the millennia (circa 1000 CE), the balance of power was decidedly in favor of the Fatimids who controlled vast swaths of territory stretching from Algeria to Multan in modern Pakistan. From their dominant position in Egypt, the Fatimids controlled the lucrative trade between the Mediterranean lands and India impoverishing the Abbasids in Baghdad.
The tug of war between the Shias and the Sunnis gave birth to many extremist movements. The Qaramatians, based in Bahrain, were a specific menace. In the year 906 CE they ambushed pilgrim caravans returning from Mecca and massacred thousands of pilgrims. In 930 CE they sacked Mecca and Madina and carried off Hijr e Aswad to Bahrain. The Black Stone was ransomed by the Abbasid Caliphs in 952 CE after paying a huge ransom and was brought back to Mecca.
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