Words, Words, Mere Words
By Dr Mohammad Taqi
Florida
“Words, words, mere words, no matter from the heart:
Th’effect doth operate another way” — Shakespeare
The perception that the Pakistani security establishment has made an about-turn in its decades-old Afghan policy continues to snowball. The impression being given is that under the new management the old way of harboring and using the Afghan Taliban to secure Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan have been dropped. Pakistan is supposed to have persuaded the Afghan Taliban and they will show up in Doha, Qatar shortly, have a series of meetings with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s team and a dua-e-khair (prayers for a favorable outcome) will seal the deal.
The Pakistani change of heart is said to have come about after the most tragic attack on the Army Public School (APS), Peshawar by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). It seems that in one go the Pakistani security establishment abandoned prosecuting its foreign policy goals through armed proxies and reached out to President Ghani, pledging to bring the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table. The Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Raheel Sharif is credited for this clean break from the past.
The policy shift illusion, however, is neither new nor really a clean break from the past. I have noted in this column for years that the Pakistani establishment’s game plan has been to outwait the US and international forces in Afghanistan. The idea all along has been to wear both Washington and Kabul down to the point that Pakistan can dictate not only the timing but also the terms of a peace deal for Afghanistan. In 2001-2002,Taliban assets were tactically harbored in safe havens west of the Durand Line in the face of overwhelming US might, only to be re-inducted later. Former military dictator Pervez Musharraf made a similar ‘clean break’ from the jihadists in his so-called landmark speech in January 2002. Musharraf even nominally banned a slew of jihadist outfits but none were actually decommissioned. He told the world umpteen times that Pakistan was not harboring the Afghan Taliban only to concede in multiple interviews 13 years later that Pakistan did use the Taliban as proxies. A loudmouth and highly visible Musharraf and the reclusive Taliban leader Mullah Omar are now the bad cops while the incumbent COAS is about to undo the damage done by the former two.
The former COAS, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, is now the piñata for having delayed an operation in North Waziristan. Like Generals Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Ziaul Haq, Kayani as an individual is the fall guy despite every indication that he did not veer an inch from the institutional playbook, which strives to secure a seat for the Taliban at the negotiations in Kabul if not the government there.
The endgame is playing out exactly as it was supposed to, perhaps even better. The Pakistani objectives and/or possible post-US scenarios in Afghanistan focused on securing a government in Kabul under Pakistan’s tutelage a la the 1996 Taliban regime if possible. Elbowing India out of Afghanistan has been the Pakistani establishment’s objective but perhaps even they could not have thought of getting China in there.
China, replacing — not augmenting — both India and the US’s cooperation with Afghanistan is the geopolitical jackpot that Pakistan seems to think it has hit with President Ashraf Ghani’s recent overtures to Beijing and Islamabad. The ‘spectacular’ attacks in Afghan garrison cities and the capital of Kabul stopped suddenly. A similar respite in such vicious attacks took place a few years back also when the then Afghan president, Mr Hamid Karzai, was trying to negotiate a deal with Pakistan and is said to have asked what exactly he could do to stop the bloodshed. Apparently, a diplomatic ‘non-paper’ was sent to Mr Karzai stating that if he severed ties with India the lull could be prolonged. Mr Karzai said no thanks to the offer, which according to him trampled upon Afghan sovereignty. Ironically, going forward, Pakistan’s Afghan policy remains a throwback to the ‘great game’ and, more recently, the Cold War era, to mark a presumed sphere of influence. When the Pakistani establishment could not induce Afghanistan in the 1980s to succumb to its aims, it tried to stand on the US’s shoulders to stare the Afghans down. This time around China appears to be emerging as the crutch to salvage a dead policy.
President Ashraf Ghani has invested pretty much all the political capital he has amassed over the past 13 years into securing a deal with Pakistan. While more ‘spectacular’ attacks are on hold, deadly terrorist attacks inside Afghanistan continue almost daily. The first all-Afghan military offensive, named Zulfikar, against the Taliban is underway in Helmand. The former and current Afghan political leaders have already impugned President Ghani’s bending over backwards to accommodate Pakistan’s desires. The Afghan military leadership has remained tightlipped but will inevitably follow suit. The spring equinox, which has for centuries marked Nowruz — literally the Afghan new year — has for the past four decades become synonymous with the start of the fighting season and ensuing bloodshed. Chances are slim to none that the Afghan Taliban will concede anything substantial let alone a ceasefire to President Ghani over the next several months.
With a deal in sight the Taliban will drag their feet while fighting through the summer months. The effect does operate another way where enough time is bought for Pakistan and China to try to lockout India, not just from geopolitics but also the economy of Afghanistan and Central Asia. Being a suave scholar and a sharp economist, President Ghani must already be cognizant of the dialectics that lie ahead but it seems that like President Barack Obama, a cloud of academic vacillation is already forming over his decisions. If the carnage continues this summer, President Ghani will face a lot of opposition at home; buying too much into mere words has a steep political price after all.
(The writer can be reached at mazdaki@me.com)
