Another Operation in Karachi
By Syed Kamran Hashmi
Westfield, IN
A mountain of crises awaited Mian Nawaz Sharif - a man infamous for his ultra short attention span - after he won the general elections. Could he solve them? Absolutely not. So, he did what he does the best: simplified and short listed his priorities. In fact, he squeezed them down to just three: the Taliban insurgency and terrorism in KPK, the electricity crisis across the nation and the worsening law and order situation in Karachi. By doing so he must realize the outcome of these decisions would define his legacy and might even determine the results of the next elections.
His first initiative to restore peace through dialogue with TTP failed, and failed quite miserably. While he kept on dragging the issue for a year, the ‘third party’ stepped in and decided for him what needed to be done in the North Waziristan. Regarding the power crisis, his strategy to pay off the circulatory debt yielded temporary results, as expected. However, the country without a back up financial plan to keep the debt from building up, dipped back into darkness. Whether in the next three years, Pakistan would emerge from the electricity crisis is yet to be seen. His team, under the leadership of Mian Shahbaz Sharif, although is working hard to resolve the problem; nonetheless, based on Shahbaz Sharif’s poor administrative capabilities, it is difficult to imagine a successful outcome. So, I would count that a failure too.
Now, let us come to his third major decision: the grand operation in Karachi. Before he swore in, the number of politically motivated target killings had been rising, and the city had turned into a war zone between the feuding political parties, their militant wings, the Taliban and the criminal gangs. The government - which included both the PPP and the MQM - evaded the responsibility, and wasted more time pointing fingers at each other instead of taking the bull by the horn. Mian Nawaz Sharif, having almost no stake in the city, hence took the initiative. He went to Karachi a few times and sat with all the mainstream political forces including the emerging PTI. After a few meetings and with the consent of all the members, a decision was made and an operation was launched in September of 2013.
One and a half years later, after the operation has failed to achieve almost all its targets, the city still reeks of crime like a putrefying dead body, the reason many experts believe the federal government would intensify its efforts after the senate elections. You can hear the Prime Minister hinting about it too. First, the frequency of his visits to the capital of Sindh has shot up, an indication of his concern. And second, just last week, while addressing a seminar, he admitted the partial failure of the ongoing operation. “Karachi will once again become the city of lights,” he said. “ The ongoing operation in the port city would not be left half way and would continue till its logical end.”
So the question is why did the current operation not yield favorable results? Or perhaps we should ask: if military operations have ever produced positive outcomes? Yes, in the short term, they do reduce the criminal activity, because the criminal gangs or political parties hide their members in the initial phase. But, no, in the long run, the military operations do not work. As the time goes on and the groups learn the tactics of the (para)military forces, they reorganize and resume their activities - and they always succeed. Unbelievable, I agree, especially when the whole country congratulates the armed forces for their exceptional performance.
Let me elaborate: in our minds, somehow a standalone, yet a grand military operation would do the trick on every issue and in every part of the country. We assume the army would collect the electricity bills, establish a nuclear plant, develop a real estate project, curb terrorism, oversee foreign policy, run military courts, bring financial accountability, and fight off politicians, all at the same time. The fact is, on the one hand, the uncalled for interference of the military may turn a bad situation like Baluchistan into a complete disaster. While on the other, success lies in developing team work and focusing on coordination between the various government organizations (civilian and military) just like the cricket in which fielding is as important as batting and bowling. Sure, we create an awe with the thunder of Army tanks rolling in, their automatic machine guns standing atop, but, without the backing of civilian institutions and political will, every operation is bound to fail.
Try counting the number of operations in Karachi in the last twenty-five years. Here I am not mentioning the operations in Baluchistan, numerous ones in FATA and the last operation in Swat, all of which yielded short-term victories and all of them failed to deliver long term benefits.
On June 19, 1992, General Asif Nawaz Janjua with (or without) the information of the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mian Nawaz Sharif launched a major assault on the city. It lasted for two years, without reaching a conclusion. In 1993-94, Benazir Bhutto Administration converted that endeavor into a Rangers-led action which was overseen by General (Retd) Naseerullah Babar. That lasted for another three years. The crime rate dropped in the beginning, for sure, but it rose again (with a vengeance) in the years to come. Somewhere during this time, the Rangers was deployed in Karachi on permanent basis hoping to assist the police. And in their presence the city has fallen further in the hands of criminals. The third major operation started in 2013 with near zero outcome; and in 2015 we are talking about the fourth one. Do you call it a success? I guess if that is how we define victory then I would proclaim Pakistan’s victory in the 1971 war as well.
