Peace Prospects in Afghanistan
By Dr Mohammad Taqi
Florida
Peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government, which were virtually dead since the former president, Mr Hamid Karzai got the Taliban political office in Qatar shut down in 2013, seem to have been resuscitated over this past weekend. Still, neither side was willing to describe their proximity meeting in al-Khor, Qatar as formal negotiations but seemed excited about the event, which was organized by the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, a non-governmental organization that specializes in conflict resolution. Indeed, Pugwash Secretary General Mr P. Cotta-Ramusino was quick to point out in his official post-meeting communiqué that “the meeting was clearly characterized from the start as a non-official meeting where all participants were free to express their personal opinions on a non-attributive basis”.
The attendees from both sides, however, included names that made the Qatar moot as close to official negotiations as it could get. The Taliban were more forthcoming about the meeting and had publicly named their representatives, led effectively by the deputy head of the Taliban political committee, Sher Muhammad Abbas Stanekzai, in a statement prior to what they described as a conference. From the government’s side, the deputy chairman of the High Peace Council (HPC), Atta Ludin, and the current Afghan president’s uncle were reportedly present along with at least three women. While the women are among the Afghan HPC members, the Qatar conference was perhaps the most high profile engagement of women leaders with the Taliban. Going by what one of the women delegates, Malalai Shinwari, told the media after the event, the Taliban seemed cautious about putting their best foot forward on gender issues. Indeed, the Pugwash summary of the conference highlights that “the value of education for both men and women was underlined by everybody”. It is hard to believe that from their erstwhile regime’s religious police beating up of women unaccompanied by a male relative, the Taliban have moved on to conversing and apparently even praying together with women delegates in Al-Khor for ideological reasons but it is also difficult to ignore the slick gesture as a political concession.
Another significant break from the Taliban’s past stance was their apparent willingness to acknowledge the Constitution and a hint towards sharing power. According to the Pugwash statement, delegates agreed that “the structure of the political system (and the Constitution of Afghanistan) should be discussed in detail and, while different opinions may arise in this respect, there is a general agreement that no party should have a monopoly on power.” Except for perhaps an offer to share power made to Mr Karzai in November 2001 via their defence minister, Mullah Naqibullah — and nixed by the US — the Taliban have not showed an inclination to join the government. This is also in contrast to the mujahideen stance visà- vis the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which ruled out any power sharing after the Soviet withdrawal.
It is too early to tell what the Taliban and, more importantly, the Afghan people could expect from such power-sharing arrangement but it certainly indicates a scaling back of the hopes the Taliban and their backers have had about reoccupying Kabul. The war wariness on part of the Taliban in the face of the resolute Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) backed by a continued US military presence appears to be a key in the jihadists downgrading their ultimate objectives. It also seems that the spectre of Islamic State (IS) taking hold in Afghanistan is not only the government’s concern but that of the Taliban too; they both stated at the Pugwash conference: “The model of the socalled IS is alien to the tradition and the desires of the Afghan people.” The Taliban appear to think that the IS brand, with appropriate patrons, could dislodge them from their position as preeminent jihadists just like the Taliban had elbowed out the erstwhile mujahideen in a series of jihadist mergers and acquisitions in the mid-1990s.
The Taliban, however, have not budged from their key demand that the US and NATO forces must leave Afghanistan before they come to an official negotiations table. According to Pugwash, the conference participants discussed the “role of foreign forces that are or have been present in Afghanistan was evaluated in different ways ... everybody agreed that foreign forces have to leave Afghanistan soon”. In addition, the Taliban demanded a formal political office, ostensibly recognised by the Afghan government, removal of several names from various international terrorist lists and the release of some of their ringleaders like Anas Haqqani, who is a halfbrother of Sirajuddin Haqqani. The Haqqani network was not represented in Qatar, which is in line with that terrorist group’s past practice of letting Mullah Omar’s Taliban do the talking. The Haqqanis remain firmly allied with the Taliban and a video released right before the Qatar conference by the Taliban’s Al-Emarah media franchise also listed the Haqqani network’s media wing, the Manba’-ul-jihad (the fountainhead of jihad), among other franchisees. The propaganda vide,o titled al- Azm (the resolve), showing the Taliban capturing the outskirts of Kunduz city in northern Afghanistan and taking security officials hostage, is narrated in Pashto with Dari Farsi clips of Afghan government officials speaking about the assault.
Taliban attacks in Kunduz, Badakhshan and Farah provinces indicate that they are clearly sticking to fighting and talking simultaneously, the possible thaw at Qatar notwithstanding. Some of these attacks, which were repelled by the ANSF, have been both stealthy and massive, suggesting elaborate military planning and training that may not be possible without a sanctuary outside Afghanistan. The Afghan national security advisor, Mr Hanif Atmar’s remarks in the wake of these assaults in Afghanistan’s west and north raised concern that the talks might be moving forward despite Pakistan’s interference, not because of it. Mr Atmar told Afghanistan’smasharano jirga (council of elders
or senate) that “We asked Pakistan to help us in the peace process but our main demand was to eliminate insurgent hideouts located across the Afghan border. And we will not show any flexibility towards Pakistan in this respect.” Interestingly, both sides at the Pugwash Conference agreed that “relations with neighboring countries should be kept amicable, and cooperation with such countries should be strengthened. This does not mean that neighboring countries are welcome to interfere with Afghan internal affairs.” As things stand after the Qatar conference, a formal dialogue between the Afghan government and the Taliban appears less likely before the summer fighting is over this year but a second round of proximity talks will have to happen sooner rather than later if the prospects of a negotiated peace in Afghanistan are to be kept alive.