Resolving the Waziristan Crisis
By Dr Akbar Ahmed
American University
Washington, DC

Early in March this year, the first US drone strike under President Donald Trump was carried out in Waziristan. It was also the first US drone strike in Pakistan in nine months and thus represented a restart in the drone war in the region.
When seen in the context of the US dropping of the so-called "Mother of All Bombs" or MOAB, the largest non-nuclear bomb in the US arsenal, on ISIS targets in Afghanistan's Nangarhar Province on the Pakistan border, it is clear that Trump is escalating the "war on terror" in the region. How long, one wonders, before the MOAB will be used in Waziristan or Pakistan if ISIS, which Trump has vowed to wipe "from the face of the earth," is sighted.
In the late 1970s, I served as the Political Agent in charge of South Waziristan-Waziristan is split into North and South Waziristan Agencies - and I remember the land and the people there very fondly. Yet the 9/11 attacks would result in a profound change in Waziristan. President Obama would describe Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which includes Waziristan, as the "most dangerous place in the world" as the region became embroiled in the US-led global war on terror. Both the US, which launched more drone attacks in Waziristan than any other place in the world, and the Pakistan military began pummeling Waziristan, resulting in violence, chaos and immense suffering and dislocation for the local tribal Pukhtun population.
In my 2013 book The Thistle and the Drone: How America's War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam, I analysed what has gone wrong in Waziristan and how it might be improved. I see the problems of Waziristan-as well as Baluchistan-as the result of a crisis in relations between the "center," or Pakistan government, and tribal societies on the periphery. These societies are organised into tribes and clans tracing descent from common ancestors, and people live by a code of honour that includes hospitality and revenge. In The Thistle and the Drone, I showed how this conflict was not only taking place in Pakistan but could be found across the world from Morocco to the Philippines. In all, I examined 40 such case studies. The involvement of the US after 9/11 has exacerbated these center/periphery conflicts, leading to the chaos and instability we see in many Muslim societies today.
Traditionally, Waziristan functioned on the basis of three pillars of authority: councils of tribal elders, they governed and settled disputes; the imams, and the government representative or Political Agent. Following 9/11, this structure has almost collapsed. In 2004, the Pakistan army entered Waziristan, marking the first time central government troops had entered the area on this scale since British colonisation. There have been a series of operations in Waziristan since then which have had varying degrees of success, but if the goal was to restore normalcy, law and order, safety, and security to the population there, they have not achieved their objective. Making the situation worse were the drone strikes, which frequently killed civilians. The lives of the people of Waziristan-attacked one day by the Pakistan army, the next by militant groups, and the next by US drones - became a living hell.
The chaos in Waziristan has created a vacuum that has been filled by militant groups like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The militant groups targeted all three pillars of authority: tribal elders were killed - over 400 in Waziristan alone; symbols of government were attacked, such as the 2014 massacre at a military school in Peshawar that killed 141 people including 132 children; and imams who did not submit to their warped view of Islam were killed and mosques were blown up. While these groups claimed to speak for Islam, in fact they were representing a mutated view of the tribal code of honour, particularly the code of revenge, which they used to justify many of their actions. The Peshawar school massacre, for example, was, according to the TTP, carried out in revenge for Pakistan military operations in North Waziristan.
There is a lack of a long-term policy and objective when it comes to Waziristan and FATA. Our policies thus far have been short term and focused on military operations. The people of the area are rarely, if ever, consulted. The Pakistan government should recognise that only when the traditional pillars of authority are once again functioning can stability return to the region. The center must treat the periphery with dignity and respect and keep it onside. Old oppressive colonial laws like the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) must be repealed but replaced with a law that is just and accessible. The long-suffering people of Waziristan need schools, medical facilities, roads, electric lines, and economic opportunities.
President Trump must also understand that drone strikes are imprecise and their use in a place like Waziristan has been counterproductive. Only through the method of rebuilding Waziristan and respecting its culture will terrorism be contained. A military solution has been attempted for the past decade and a half in the region and has not yielded results. It is unrealistic to believe that it will now.
(The writer is an author, poet, filmmaker, playwright, and the Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies, American University in Washington, DC. He formerly served as the Pakistani High Commissioner to the UK and Ireland. He tweets @AskAkbar)