Afghan-on-Afghan
By Mowahid Hussain Shah

 

On Leap Day February 29, it was another violent day in America, with multiple shootings in Kansas City, Missouri. Thousands of miles away in Qatar, there was a “peace agreement” between the US and the Taliban. It is, in effect, an exit deal.
The core elements of the agreement are contingent on four happenings: (1) Reduction in violence; (2) Taliban to spurn Al Qaeda; (3) Taliban to take on Daesh; and (4) Intra-Afghan negotiations between the Taliban and the existing Afghan government, leading to a power-sharing agreement. That, in theory, are the contours of the deal, which is already showing signs of fraying. But abstractions are one thing and practicalities are another.The fact of the matter is that America, with all its technological might and spending more than 1 trillion dollars, could not subdue an insurgent fighting force.
75 years ago, Germany fell and so did Japan to Allied Powers. Then, in 1945, instruments of surrender were signed. This time, notably, there were no instruments of surrender.
In a world of asymmetric warfare, the limits and futility of military solutions stand exposed 20 years after the “war on terror” was launched by Bush, Jr.
This agreement, in effect, is its tacit acknowledgement. It has been a mismatch of epic proportions – the world’s mightiest technological power taking on the most primitive. Yet, there is no victory. The results speak for themselves.
For Israel and for India, who are busy attempting to subjugate Palestinians and the people of Kashmir, there is a larger lesson here.
With all the academic prowess, stratospheric endowments, and lavishly funded think-tanks in Washington, the litany of failures makes for sorry reading. It necessitates self-questioning. The perception of retreat cannot be easily washed away.
American withdrawal supposedly will be gradual and condition-based. Pretty it may appear on paper – the specter of Taliban doing America’s work in fighting Daesh – but how likely is it to bear fruition on the ground?
There is too much bad blood between the Taliban and the Afghan government to now muster sufficient trust to forge a sustainable intra-Afghan power-sharing agreement. Deep-seated animosities cannot be switched off with the flick of political convenience. Meanwhile, Afghan-on-Afghan violence remains as is.
Then, too, there is toxic anti-Pakistan animus amongst broad segments of the Afghan elite to the extent that some irrationally see Daesh as a stop-gap Pakistan handiwork to offset the Taliban-US deal.
Amongst Pakistan policy circles, the perception endures that Afghan elites are besotted with India. This was further compounded by US encouragement to insert India into Afghanistan, thus putting Pakistan in a nutcracker situation between a hostile India and a pro-India Kabul. In his report of August 30, 2009, submitted to the Pentagon, Commander of US Forces in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal stated: “Increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures.”
Acclaimed American novelist James Michener traveled to Afghanistan just after World War II and, based on his observations, wrote a novel, “Caravans,” later to be a major motion picture in 1978 starring Anthony Quinn. In his book, Michener presciently had forewarned that if the Afghans did not put their house in order, it would open the doors to a Soviet takeover.
So, what could be the best plan for Afghanistan? The best plan would be to have no military plan.