1971 – Part 2
By Dr Khalid Siddiqui
Ohio

 

March 25, 1971 - April 30, 1971

On March 25, 1971, Yahya Khan ordered the Army Action. Named ‘Operation Searchlight’ it was set for 1:00 am on March 26. The news of the operation was received with cheers by all the passengers on board the ship Rustom. The Pakistani Army (PA) moved swiftly in Dacca around midnight (an hour earlier than the H-hour), firing through the protesting crowd near the university, demolishing the hostels, and killing the students, professors and activists. 500 students were killed. According to Karrar Ali Agha’s book ‘Witness to Carnage’, the Pakistani Army found 20 young naked ‘Bihari’ girls locked up in a room in a hostel, some for the past 15 days. They had been repeatedly gang-raped. 5 of them later died of internal injuries. On the other hand, the Bengalis reported that PA had abducted Bengali girls from the hostels. This seems very unlikely because the University had been closed, and hostels vacated, since early March. The only people who were at the University (specially Jagannath Hall and Iqbal Hall), at that time, were the rebel students and Awami League (AL) cadres. Mujib and Kamal Hussain were arrested in the early morning of March 26, as they had decided not to flee. But all the other top leaders of Awami League had fled to India.

Before March 25, 1971, Bengali troops in EP (East Pakistan) comprised of 4,500 infantrymen in ten battalions of the EBR (East Bengal Regiment); 2,000 in EBRC ( East Bengal Regimental Center ) in Chittagong; 16,000 EPR (East Pakistan Rifles) personnel; about 45,000 Bengali police officers; and 50,000 Ansars. 70,000 from these outfits later joined Mukti Bahini. Pakistan Army in EP had 9,750 infantrymen, 4,500 gunners, 2,000 EPR personnel, and a tank regiment.

It was a race against time for the PA to send reinforcements to the cantonments to save the WP (West Pakistani) officers before they were killed by the Bengalis. They were too late everywhere except in Dacca. Only in Dacca the WP regiments were successful in disarming the EBR, EPR and the police in time. Many fled, others were eliminated. However, before fleeing they looted the houses of ‘Biharis’, and killed as many of them as they could. Many Pathans were also targeted in Dacca.

As the news of Army Action spread across EP, the Bengali soldiers of the EBR revolted in the cantonments, one after another, before the reinforcements could arrive. All senior officers, who were from WP, and their families were killed. When the PA finally arrived, it found the dead and mutilated bodies of the WP Army personnel. Unbelievably, none of  the Bengali officers of the 23 Field Regiment at Saidpur revolted, and remained steadfast in their loyalty. There were few more Bengali Officers in EBR who never revolted. After the creation of Bangladesh, some of them were court-martialed, and later executed. I am aware of two Bengali Army officers who were stationed in WP and opted to stay in WP. One is Maj. Abdul Ghaffar who lives in Karachi now. The other one is deceased.

Once Operation Searchlight started in Dacca, the Bengali public from the cities started fleeing to their hometowns and villages in droves. According to the Urdu book  جیون ایک کہانی , the Biharis had a field day. They looted the houses of the fleeing Bengalis thoroughly. In the villages, the Bengalis spread the news, sometimes highly exaggerated, of the atrocities committed by the PA on the Bengalis. That led to the reprisal attacks by the Bengalis against the ‘Biharis’ even in the small towns. The mantra was “Loot, kill and burn.”

Once the cantonments had been secured, the Army fanned out to the smaller towns. However, it was too late for the ‘Biharis’. All PA saw was the decomposing dead bodies of ‘Biharis’. The perpetrators of the massacre, i.e. EBR, EPR, police and Mukti Bahini had all fled to India. The Pakistani Army let its anger on those innocent Bengalis who had preferred to stay, and some of them may even have protected the Biharis. So, the innocent ‘Biharis’ and the innocent Bengalis both suffered – ‘Biharis’ at the hands of the Bengali rebels, and Bengalis at the hands of the Pakistan Army! The result was the total alienation of the Bengali population, with the sole exception of the members of the Jamaat-e-Islami. 

As compared to Dacca, the situation in Chittagong cantonment was much different. The Bengalis substantially outnumbered the West Pakistanis in Chittagong ( 5,000 vs 600), which was a cause for concern to the Pakistani planners. 20 Baluch regiment was at half-strength. The Navy had 300 sailors at the Naval Base. EBRC housed 2,000 Bengali troops in the cantonment. Deliberately half of the Bengali soldiers from 8 EBR were moved to WP, and the battalion itself was moved away from the cantonment to Sholashahar. The cantonment was to be reinforced by the 53 Brigade stationed at Comilla. It was to leave at 3:00 am on 26 March and arrive in Chittagong by 6:00 am – a distance of 100 miles. 

However, at 8:30 pm on March 25, the Bengali Capt. Rafiq of EPR in Chittagong got the hint of the troops movement in Dacca. At 10:30 pm (even before Operation Searchlight had officially started) he went to the EPR HQ at Halishahar where 300 WP troops and 600 Bengali troops were housed. EPR revolted and arrested all the 300 WP soldiers. Messages were sent to all the EPR companies in the outlying areas to eliminate WP soldiers and return to Chittagong ASAP. At 11:30 pm the CO of 20 Baluch Regiment, Lt. Col. Fatami, in the cantonment preemptively attacked the EBRC, killing around 50 and capturing 500 Bengali troops. The remaining soldiers fled. Some of the survivors reached 8 EBR lines in Sholashahar carrying the bad news. Maj. Zia, the 2IC (Second in Command), ordered the regiment to revolt. All the WP officers were arrested and executed. Maj. Zia himself shot his CO (Commanding Officer), Lt. Col. Rashid Janjua. Maj. Zia had received Hilal-i-Jur’at in the 1965 War. He went on to become the President of Bangladesh in 1977. The 8 EBR under Maj. Zia left the city and took positions at the Kalurghat bridge around 1:15 am, March 26.

The bulk of the 53 Brigade detachment, under the command of Brig. Iqbal Shafi left Comilla for Chittagong, as planned, around 3:00 am, March 26. It was to arrive at Chittagong cantonment by 6:00 am, but it faced several delays because the Bengali civilians had set up barricades and blown up the bridges. Much behind schedule, around 7:00 pm, March 26 it arrived in Kumira – still 13 miles north of Chittagong. There it was ambushed by the rebel Bengali soldiers of EPR. It suffered heavy casualties and remained bogged down there until March 29, 1971. 

So, for several days Chittagong city was at the mercy of Mukti Bahini and EPR soldiers. The police also revolted. The guns and ammunition looted from the police armory were freely distributed among the Mukti Bahini. Mukti Bahini and EPR, with the help of the Bengali peace committee members, hunted down the ‘Biharis’. Their shops and factories were looted. The Bengali members of the peace committee would go to a ‘Bihari’ house and force the head of the household to come along on one pretext or the other, but mostly to ‘protect’ them from the angry mob. They would be handed over to Mukti Bahini or EPR who would kill them at their make-shift bases. More often than not, they would go back, round up the rest of the family, take them away in jeeps to a distant location, and kill them. Those who refused to go were killed right in their homes. The same pattern was repeated throughout EP suggesting a pre-planned strategy.

In the Ispahani Jute Mills and other factories at Kalurghat industrial area, some 5,000 ‘Biharis’, including 300 women and children, were butchered by the Bengali rebels. There were incidents of rape also.

There were many other factories in and around Chittagong, like Usmania Glass Works, Amin Jute Mills in Bibirhat, and Karnaphuli Paper and Ryon Mills at Chandragona, where the ‘Bihari’ employees and their families were murdered.

Maj. Zia made a daring attack on 20 Baluch and killed 250 soldiers. The depleted 20 Baluch remained fortified in the cantonment. With WP troops bogged down at Kumira and inside the cantonment at Chittagong, the troops from the Naval Base had to be brought in to control the deteriorating situation in Chittagong. There was a large number of Bengali soldiers at the Naval Base which was a security risk. Those Bengali soldiers couldn’t be left behind at the port. A WP battalion was flown in from Dacca. First the Bengali soldiers at the port were disarmed and executed, then the troops from the Naval Base along with the reinforced battalion under Brig. Ansari moved into the city inch by inch. They met resistance from the Bengali rebels every step of the way. Even the Bengali civilians slowed their progress by erecting roadblocks. Fire support to the Pakistani troops was provided by PNS Babur and Jahangir and 2 gunboats, plus a mortar battery. The buildings at the EPR HQ at Halishahar were levelled by shellfire – inadvertently killing all the Pakistani POWs. The rebels started fleeing to Ramgarh near the Indian state of Tripura. Captain Rafiq and Major Zia had secured aid from the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) by 6 April, and were busy organizing Bengali forces around Ramgarh. Bengali troops had captured 18 Pakistani officers near Ramgarh including Lt Col Sheikh and Maj Iqbal. All of them surrendered to the Indian authorities. So, some Pakistani troops had surrendered to the Indians as early as April 1971! Finally, by April 10, the Pakistan Army had secured Chittagong – almost two weeks after the start of the Operation Searchlight. Brig Ansari was awarded Hilal-i-Jurat and the rank of Major General for securing Chittagong.

PA also suffered heavy casualties in Kushtia and Pabna. On March 26, an entire company (150 men) from 27 Baluch, sent to Kushtia from Jessore, was eliminated by the revolting 1 EBR troops. On the same day a company (148 men) from 25 Punjab, sent to Pabna from Rajshahi, met heavy resistance from the rebels. All except 18 died, including all the officers. At Rajshahi, EPR had attacked two companies of the 25 Punjab and killed everyone. At Thakurgaon, the rebels of the EPR killed their WP Commanding officer.

When I left Chittagong on March 22, there were four non-Bengali residents still working at the medical college – two Biharis and two Kashmiris. When the Army Action started at midnight March 25, 1971, the Bengali doctors and staff went after them. Amazingly, one Bengali doctor and one Hindu nurse came to their rescue. They would hide them in the storeroom and doctor’s sleeping quarters alternately, and would lock the door from outside. They would bring some food once or twice a day. This went on for several days until Brig Ansari ‘liberated’ the Medical College on March 29. As the Pakistani Army was approaching the city, the rebels including the Hindus were fleeing the city. The Hindu nurse unlocked the door for the last time and gave the news of the approaching Pakistani Army (PA). She was sure that PA would kill her. Despite the assurances from the four residents, she wouldn’t stay. She was fleeing to her village first, and then to India. No one knows what happened to her, but the Bengali doctor was identified as Kaiser Ahmed Khondkar. By a strange twist of events, two very vocal nationalist Bengali professors got scared when the PA started looking for miscreants in the hospital. For two days they remained holed up in their offices in the hospital, and the same four residents would bring food to them! The residents left for WP soon after that. Several years later, one of those four went back to Bangladesh, located Dr Khondkar, and personally thanked him for risking his life to save them. Dr Khondkar presently is an anesthesiologist in the UK.

The ‘Bihari’ death toll in Chittagong and its neighboring townships during March 1971 was around 20,000. The exact number couldn’t be determined because the decomposed bodies were burnt and many were thrown into the rivers.

In the smaller towns the situation was worse. The Biharis living there had fully assimilated into the Bengali culture, but they were still considered security risks, and collaborators. Their numbers had never been high enough for them to form residential colonies of their own. There was no cantonment nearby where the help would come from. So, being isolated, they were easy pickings. Therefore, compared to the big cities, the death rate in these towns was disproportionately high for its population of ‘Biharis’. In the beginning, some Bengali neighbors did try to protect the ‘Biharis’ but later, for fear of reprisal, they withdrew their support. The Pakistan Army did come to small towns but, by that time, hardly any ‘Bihari’ was left there - either they were dead or had fled to other towns.  Some Biharis from the bordering towns, fearing attacks from the rebel Bengalis, felt safer crossing the border into India!

Saidpur, a town in the northwest of EP had the population of 70,000, out of which 70-80% were ‘Biharis’. Most of them worked in the railways as it housed a large workshop and the divisional headquarters of PER. In the cantonment, the EBR revolted and launched a surprise attack on the WP officers. The Pakistan Army, however, was able to overpower them and secure the base. There were only a few incidents of violence in the town itself, but in the outlying areas around 5,000 Biharis were killed. 

Santahar (District Bogra) is a large railway-junction town. 22,000 ‘Biharis’ lived there. When the news of the atrocities committed by the PA on the Bengalis in Dacca reached Santahar, the Mukti Bahini took revenge on the ‘Biharis’. 17,000 ‘Biharis’ were killed. There were numerous cases of rape also. Many girls were taken to India. The Pakistani Army didn’t arrive there until April 27, 1971. Seeing that many dead bodies of the ‘Biharis’, the PA went on a killing spree of the innocent Bengalis as a revenge.  Severe atrocities were committed against the unarmed Bengali Hindu civilians who were in no way connected to the Awami League, or the ongoing insurgency. The railway platform was choked with layers upon layers of dead bodies. 

In the cantonment in Mymensingh, the Bengalis from EBR and EPR revolted and killed all the WP officers and men on March 26-27 in a midnight surprise attack on their barracks and residential quarters, killing the families also. Pakistani Army reinforcement didn’t arrive until April 21. Around 5,000 ‘Biharis’ were killed by the Bengalis. A respectable Bengali Pesh Imam sheltered 500 ‘Biharis’ in a mosque near Mymensingh. He boldly held his ground for a few days but, ultimately, he was overpowered, and all the ‘Biharis’ inside were killed.

In Dinajpur around 15,000 ‘Biharis’ were killed. It included Punjabis; and 250 Pathans – men, women and children. March 28 was declared as the Betun Day (payment day) by the rebel Bengalis, the day when the killing of the ‘Biharis’ would start. First police, and then EPR, revolted, and then they killed all their ‘Bihari’ colleagues. The jail was broken into, and the arms were distributed among the prisoners who went on a rampage. In sector 5 of the satellite town, which was built exclusively for the Bihari immigrants, almost everyone (3,000 residents) survived because of the bravery of a few young men. They had refused to surrender their arms. They even had procured some guns from the Pakistani soldiers from the EPR camp before it had revolted. They withstood the three-week siege until the Pakistani Army arrived on April 13, 1971, from Rangpur garrison. By that time the only ‘Bihari’ survivors in the rest of Dinajpur were a few women and children.

Similar atrocities were committed by the Bengalis against the ‘Biharis’ in Rajshahi, Thakurgaon, Khulna, Rangpur, Comilla, Parbatipur and Ishurdi in addition to many other smaller towns.

Relief camps were set up by the Pakistan Army for those ‘Biharis’ whose houses were burnt down.

The rebel Bengalis were formally renamed as Mukti Bahini on April 11, 1971. By the middle of April 1971, the number of the Bengali armed rebels exploded to 176,000 when the rebels from EBR, EPR and police joined the Mukti Bahini. The Pakistani troop strength also increased to 38,717 because of the arrival of the reinforcements from WP which consisted of two divisions (15 infantry battalions, one commando battalion and two mortar batteries).

While all this was happening, the Pakistani media was touting the successful military operation in EP under Tikka Khan. There was complete blackout of the atrocities committed against the ‘Biharis’ by the rebel Bengalis lest there would be a backlash against the small community of Bengalis living in Karachi. 35 foreign newsmen were banished from Dacca on March 26, 1971. Only Simon Dring of the Daily Telegraph stayed behind as he hid on the roof of the Intercontinental Hotel. The West Pakistanis listening to the BBC would hear only about the exaggerated accounts of brutality of the PA against the Bengalis, especially the Hindus, resulting in the flow of refugees into India. It was dismissed by the WP public as Indian propaganda. The net result was that the people of WP (and we on the ship) were convinced that the situation in EP was under control. That was the mindset of the West Pakistanis when our ship arrived in Karachi by the end of March 1971. We were ridiculed by our relatives for fleeing prematurely, like cowards, while the situation in EP had been under control. I was not allowed to continue my house job at Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Center (JPMC) or Civil Hospital. So, I took up a job at Naveed Clinic. The media was so tightly controlled that I myself did not find out about the massacre of the ‘Biharis’ during the six weeks of March/April until May 1971 when more Biharis from EP arrived in WP and gave their first-hand accounts of the real situation.  

Hiding the ‘Bihari’ massacre perpetrated by the Bengalis, from the media by the Pakistani government had dire consequences for the Pakistan Army’s reputation. After the war, the mass graves of the ‘Biharis’ were shown to the foreign press by the Bangladeshi government as the graves of the Bengalis killed by the PA. Almost every book written by the Bangladeshi, Indian and Western author portrays the same image. The sole exception is the book ‘Dead Reckoning’ by Sirmila Bose from the UK. She writes: The Pakistani army has been "demonized" by the pro-liberation side and accused of "monstrous actions regardless of the evidence", while Bengali people have been depicted as "victims". "This has led to a tendency to deny, minimize or justify violence and brutalities perpetrated by pro-liberation Bengalis," she says.

So, the two main objectives of the Operation Searchlight could not be achieved, i.e. arresting  all the top brass of the Awami League, and the reinforcing of the cantonments  before the Bengali soldiers had revolted.

(To be continued)