Dr. Cohen’s
Thought-Provoking Work on Pakistan
Dr. Stephen
P. Cohen’s 367-page scholarly book on “The
Idea of Pakistan”, published a few months
back by the Brookings Institution Press, Washington,
rivets the attention of the reader as the eminent
professor offers an incisive double biography -one
of the idea of Pakistan and the other of the state
of Pakistan. The last two chapters on the Futures
of Pakistan and on American Options are perhaps
the most significant components of the book.
The idea, whose time had come in the 1940s, was
that the Indian Muslims needed a homeland for their
protection to fulfill their cultural and ‘civilizational’
destiny.
As a state Pakistan has emerged as a largely military-dominated
entity that has nuclear weapons and is characterized
by weak and uneven economic growth, political chaos,
and sectarian violence.
As for the future, the author wonders, “Whether
failure is a strong possibility. If so, would Pakistan
dissolve slowly or collapse suddenly. Would it become
an outlaw and a threat to the entire world? Or,
would Pakistan become a normal state at peace with
its neighbors and itself?”
The idea of Pakistan - the distinct identity of
the Muslims of British India - had an element of
Indian culture, implied an extension of the great
Muslim empires of South Asia, incorporated some
elements of the British Raj, and held links with
the Central Asian states and the Muslim world at
large. It would be translated into a democratic,
liberal and progressive polity.
“No proponent of the Pakistan movement”
in the words of Dr. Cohen, “dreamed that Pakistan
and India would become bitter enemies, or that the
armed forces of Pakistan would dominate Pakistani
politics.”
As a state, Pakistan has vastly deviated from the
vision of Jinnah. The emergence of the ruling triad
- military, bureaucracy and the feudal lords - the
political power of the army, the disproportionate
influence of the Islamists, the loss of the eastern
wing, and a wobbly economy would break his heart
if he saw them today.
“The obsession with Kashmir for over fifty
years can be said to have seriously damaged Pakistan’s
prospects as a state.” Pakistan has had a
military strategy for Kashmir but not a political
one.
The author describes how the army right from 1953
onwards continued to expand its political power
and was instrumental in the removal of Prime Ministers
and Presidents.
Bhutto took several steps to contain the army. The
nuclear program was to undercut the army’s
claim to being the ultimate defender of Pakistan.
The Hamoodur Rehman Commission on the conduct of
the army in the war in East Pakistan was to disgrace
the army. The Commission did recommend the trial
of Generals implicated in the coup that removed
Ayub. The Federal Security Force (FSF) was to serve
as a cushion against military interference in civilian
matters.
His counter to the army’s claim of being the
sole security shield of Pakistan was “a masterful
geopolitical innovation - an alliance with China”.
To dilute Pakistan’s military dependence on
the US and its army linkage, he advanced a vision
of Pakistan as a Non-Aligned country. He abolished
the CSP cadre to reduce the pro-army, pro-Punjab
bureaucracy.
These measures couldn’t abridge the reach
of the army and couldn’t save him from the
gallows!
American support to Pakistan was shaped by strategic
considerations. Hence the US bolstered military
regimes whether led by Ayub, Yahya, Zia or now Musharraf.
During the decade of democracy (1988-1999) four
elections were held and the disappointment of the
people is reflected in the fact that with each election
the voter turnout decreased. “Most Pakistani
would have settled for the appearance of democracy
with a modicum of good government -they got neither!”
Dr. Cohen, who heads the South Asia wing at the
Brookings Institution, a respected ‘think
tank’, gives credit to the army for several
accomplishments. Yet, he sees Pakistan as a state
“hopping on one strong leg – the army.
Army, he maintains, remains the single most important
political entity in Pakistan.
One has to have the blessings of the three As –
Allah, Army and America - to be the political head
of the country, is a popular saying in Pakistan.
Another humorless Pakistani joke is: All countries
have armies but we in Pakistan have an army with
a country attached to it.
The fact of the matter is that the Pakistan army,
besides holding political power, has under its control
vast commercial and industrial interests and owns
massive rural and urban properties.
As Dr. Cohen has put it, “Regardless of what
may be desirable, the army will continue to set
the limits on what is possible in Pakistan.”
He therefore dismisses as “alarmist”
the fear that the obscurantist and extremist Islamic
political parties will grab power if Musharraf dies
or is assassinated. Some other General would step
into his shoes. And, the Mullahs would be, as usual,
bowing and scraping before him.
“A full-blown democracy, in which the armed
forces come under firm civilian control”,
the professor maintains, “will be impossible
until Pakistan’s strategic environment alters
in such a way that the army retreats from its role
as guardian of the state.”
The defeat of the army in the 1971 war with India
did create such a situation. Mr. Bhutto had the
golden opportunity to cut the warrior caste to its
proper size. It was ready to accept such a surgery.
But, Mr. Bhutto announced a thousand year war with
India and raised the defense budget three-fold!
His subsequent measures to control the army and
consolidate his hold, already mentioned above, merely
paved his path to the gallows.
For the near future, predicts Dr. Cohen, Pakistan
will be a state-nation lodged between a weak democracy
and a benevolent autocracy.
In the long run, the lack of economic opportunity,
the booming birth rate, the youth bulge, intensive
urbanization, a failed educational system, and a
hostile regional environment could leave Pakistan
with a large, young, and ill-educated population
that has few prospects for economic advancement
and could be politically mobilized.
As for American options, the author recommends that
all American policy measures should be calculated
for the people of Pakistan - not just the men in
uniform - to see and feel the benefits of the US-Pakistan
friendship. America must assist Pakistan in its
efforts to become a globally competitive economy.
Special emphasis be laid on education. Only a meager
amount of aid now goes to this sector. To ensure
a substantial increase in Pakistan’s allocation
to education, US military aid should be linked to
this allocation. The stranglehold of private charities
for religious Madrassas should be loosened. The
army should be encouraged to break the ties it has
with the extremist Ulema parties. Numerous other
proposals have been made by the author that can’t
be mentioned even briefly in this space.
I have just finished reading the tome and it has
left me with a feeling of depression. I can’t
avoid wondering whether the learned professor has
not underplayed the bright spots while adding a
darker hue to the gray areas. It would be an utter
folly to attribute this to his Jewish background.
Surely a person of his scholarship and academic
eminence cannot but be meticulously objective. Perhaps
my depression emanates from my own attachment to
my native land and my sanguine vision of its future.
arifhussaini@hotmail.com
January 6, 2005
