Page 21 - Urdu Link - May 25, 2018
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COMMENTARY MAY 25, 2018 – PAKISTAN LINK – P21
Trump Quits Iran Deal he is for or how will get a better result, he just
n By Nayyer Ali MD proach to Obamacare. He had no idea what
resident Trump, in what can best be wanted to break anything Obama had done.
described as a foreign policy temper The vast majority of foreign policy ex-
Ptantrum, quit the Iran nuclear deal perts think Trump’s actions are terribly wrong
that Obama had carefully put together in and increase the risk of Iran going nuclear.
2015. This deal, known as That is an open question. By exiting the deal,
the JCPOA (Joint Compre- the US can reimpose its own sanctions on
hensive Plan of Action), Iran. But the frozen money has already been
was an international agree- brought back to Iran, so that cannot be un-
ment between Iran on the done. In addition, there is no chance that the
one hand and Russia, China, Europeans, Russia, or China will join any new
Germany, France, UK, and sanctions. In fact, they want to take advan-
the US on the other. It severely constrained tage of any business opportunities they can
Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, re- get at this point. The US sanctions will hurt
duced the number of centrifuges Iran could some, but nowhere near what the situation
use, and put Iran’s nuclear program under was like for Iran in 2015.
intensive monitoring. Some elements of The fact that Trump can so easily quit
the plan were time-limited to 10 years, but an international agreement makes it hard for
others were not. the next nation to trust the US will hold up its
Trump has been greatly frustrated by end of a bargain. Why would President Kim
this deal. Under the its terms, the US reviews of North Korea sign a deal with Trump to give
whether Iran is complying with the terms ev- up nuclear weapons knowing that the US can-
ery 90 days, and the President is required to not be trusted to keep its word?
certify to Congress every 90 days that that is There is a reasonable chance that the re-
the case in order to keep the deal in place. For maining parties will continue with the deal
his first year in office, Trump was willing to and Iran will stay within the terms of the
do so with great reluctance, and it was only JCPOA. That is for Iran to decide. If it pulled
under the pressure of his more sane advisors The removal of the sanctions has allowed deal. In particular, Iran continues to do weap- out and restarted its nuclear weapons pro-
that he declared Iran in compliance. In fact, Iran’s oil exports to climb from 1.5 million ons research to develop long-range missiles. gram, that would put Trump in a real bind.
Iran has been in full compliance and there are barrels per day to currently 2.7 million bpd. Iran also supports Assad in Syria and the He would have to watch Iran develop a bomb
no credible allegations that Iran is violating In addition, it has allowed Europe, Russia, and Houthis in Yemen’s civil war, and tries to in- and do nothing, or go to war. But Iran may
the deal. China to begin trading with Iran. Iran has fluence Iraqi politics. There is also Iran’s sup- feel that Trump’s act will not be the last word,
Iran benefited in two major ways from purchased new Airbus aircraft to begin mod- port of Hezbollah in Lebanon. But Obama and if they wait till 2021, a new US President
the deal. First, Iran got the release of about ernizing a very old fleet of passenger aircraft. was not trying to make Iran comply with ev- may recommit to the JCPOA if it is still oper-
30 billion dollars of Iranian funds that had What has Trump and the far-right in the ery possible American wish, he was trying to ating then.
been frozen in foreign banks, in some cases US upset about the Iran nuclear deal are two stop Iran from building nuclear weapons, and Despite the lifting of economic sanctions
going back to 1979 and the Iran hostage cri- different things. The far-right hates Iran and that goal was so important that a compromise in 2016, Iran’s economy remains troubled.
sis. These monies could replenish the Iranian really wants to overthrow the government was essential. In addition, the international Even with oil exports at a record high, the
treasury. Secondly, they got the international there. Among the neo-cons there is still some sanction regime was put in place to get Iran economy has not boomed, and unemploy-
sanctions lifted from Iran. Obama had skill- wistful longing for using military force and to negotiate on the nuclear issue, and not on ment and sluggish growth are still a big is-
fully put in place an international sanction regime change, though just about everyone anything else. Obama could not use Russia sue. Demonstrations are occurring across the
regime starting in 2010 that included Russia else in America would see that as a folly after and China to force Iran to stop supporting country. In the long run, the Iranian system
and China, which made it much more effec- the Iraq experience. These conservatives do Assad for example. needs major reforms, but the clerical struc-
tive, and was strangling the Iranian economy. acknowledge that the Iranians have complied Trump on the other hand did not engage ture is not capable of doing that because it
With this pressure, Iran had incentive to com- with the deal. Their objection is that Iran is in even this level of thought. For him, every- would mean giving up power. The Iranians
promise and give up a pathway to building its doing other things they don’t like, and that thing is very simple. If Obama was for it, he may not have the appetite to challenge the US
own nuclear weapons. these behaviors are not constrained by the has to try to destroy it. It was his same ap- by going for the bomb.
n By Moeed Yusuf New Envoy to the US? on security — specifically with regard to Afgha-nistan — and
Washington, DC there are no prospects for a return to a broader dialogue. The
majority of the engagements of the new ambassador are certain
he writer is the author of Brokering Peace in Nuclear to be about hard security issues bedeviling the partnership.
Environments: U.S. Crisis Management in South Precisely because of the relative lack of regard for the For-
TAsia (Stanford University Press, 2018). eign Office and the security bias in bilateral ties, Pakistani am-
IT seems that Pakistan will have a new ambassador in bassadors who are perceived to have some cache on both the
Washington after all. Press reports indicate that ambassador- civilian and military sides of the aisle have had more to offer in
designate Ali Jehangir Siddiqui may take over Washington. I am not sure where Siddiqui stands on this count
before the PML-N government leaves office. Sid- but the perception in Washington is that his appointment may
diqui’s nomination has intrigued watchers of the not have had the blessings of the security establishment.
Pakistan-US relationship. Recently, some of my Some of these policy analysts wondered if the real impli-
colleagues in Washington’s policy community cation of his appointment was that the civilian government
sat down to make sense of it. Parts of our con- would be willing to let the military directly engage Washington
versation bear recounting. on the security aspects of the ties while the new ambassador
Let me be clear that none of this discussion was pointed at focuses on whatever little he can do in the economic sphere.
Siddiqui. I, for one, have never met him. Nor is it my place to Third, no one can make head or tail of the timing of Sid-
pass judgement on his fate as an ambassador should he make diqui’s appointment. Ironically, his nomination in early March
the coveted post. He has an impressive resumé otherwise and forced the current Pakistani ambassador into lame-duck mode
I wish him well. while the timing of his arrival means he too will be firmly in
The concerns raised by the policy analysts I huddled with this category from the get go. Realistically, I doubt he’ll be able
were institutional in nature. They were about the conduct of to gain any traction in Washington till after the elections —
Pakistan — the state. First, they wondered how Pakistan could and that too if the PML-N returns to power. Otherwise, you’d
realistically expect the world to take its international engage- have wasted four precious months at a time when the fast-
ments seriously when its leaders continue to disempower the deteriorating relationship requires daily attention and engage-
custodians of diplomacy. ment in Washington.
Siddiqui’s nomination was a classic example of individual Finally, going beyond this case, my colleagues delivered
whims trumping institutions. The decision to nominate him the punch line for Pakistani officials by explaining where Paki-
was made in the Prime Minister’s Secretariat with no real buy- stan falters in comparison to its peers. Comparing India and
in from the Foreign Office. The signal for the institution was Pakistan, they perceived both as having equally good human
a demoralizing one. Even some of the finest in the diplomatic capacity but argued that one derived strength from an elite
corps feel irrelevant in such moments — and the feeling will and much of Pakistan’s diplomatic approach and lingo harken consensus on priorities for the country’s foreign policy and
continue to spread as long as leaders keep circumventing them. back to the Cold War. clarity on roles of the various institutions executing it while
Second, they doubted if those who picked Siddiqui the other’s hand was weakened by its inability to engage as a
grasped how the nomination may be seen in Washington. In Siddiqui’s nomination was a classic example of coherent unitary actor.
their view, the choice may reflect a lack of appreciation of what individual whims trumping institutions. The decision Based on their prior interactions with Pakistani officials,
the job of a Pakistani ambassador in the US entails. to nominate him was made in the Prime Minister’s they noted internal bickering and a defensive attitude towards
Pointing to Siddiqui’s business background, one of my Secretariat with no real buy-in from the Foreign Office. policies they articulate as being typical of Pakistan’s way of do-
colleagues who seemed to have an inside scoop suggested that The signal for the institution was a demoralizing ing business.
Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi’s intent may have been one. Even some of the finest in the diplomatic corps Dare I say that these observations are quite widely shared
to signal his desire to focus on non-security aspects of the bi- feel irrelevant in such moments — and the feeling among Pakistan watchers in the Western world. They need not
lateral relationship. I tend to agree. In the past, I have heard be taken at face value. Still, they demand serious introspection
from (then minister) Abbasi his fairly negative view of Paki- will continue to spread as long as leaders keep by Pakistan.
stani diplomacy. He perceives the country’s diplomatic orien- circumventing them
tation to be heavily security centric and behind the times. (The writer is the author of Brokering Peace in Nuclear
On this, the prime minister is spot on. Pakistan’s India- What he may have overlooked, however, is that the pres- Environments: US Crisis Management in South Asia, Stanford
fixated security outlook runs deep within the Foreign Office ent tenor of the Pakistan-US relationship is singularly focused University Press, 2018)
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