Is Iraq Dissolving?
Despite the
fact that the Constitutional Committee in Iraq did
produce a draft document to submit to Parliament
for debate, the future of Iraq is looking murkier.
Not only is it an open question whether Bush can
defeat the insurgency, but it is becoming increasingly
obvious that the fundamental ability of the Iraqis
to hold together as a single nation is in play.
On the insurgent side, the scale of violence continues
unabated. Despite Bush’s best efforts, hundreds
of Iraqis die monthly in attacks. US forces continue
to die by roadside bombs and occasional firefights.
A strong insurgency can be beaten. In true numbers,
there are probably only about 20,000 Iraqis who
are hardcore members of the insurgency, and this
force could be ground down. But a military solution
would literally take years. Historically the military
defeat of a strong insurgency takes 5-10 years,
and there is no reason to think that a similar timeline
would not apply to Iraq. The Iraqi insurgency is
also being fed by suicide bombers coming from outside.
Most of the suicide bombers that have been identified
were non-Iraqis, mostly Saudis. The ideal solution
for the Americans is to have a sufficiently capable
Iraqi army they could handoff the war to. As of
this point that still looks a long way off.
The true situation in Iraq is difficult for most
Muslims to acknowledge. Painful as it is to admit,
the insurgency is not an “Iraqi” insurgency.
It is based almost entirely among the Sunnis, and
its principal victims are the Shias.
Just recently, rumors of a suicide bomber in a crowd
of Shia pilgrims sparked a stampede that killed
650 people, mostly the elderly, women, and children.
Iraq in fact is not a single country with a shared
identity, but rather three distinct large communities
with very different interests. The Arab Sunnis were
the dominant faction since the British installed
them in power in the 1920’s, and this was
compounded by Saddam Hussein, who chose his entire
senior leadership from this community. While Shias
served as conscripts in his wars, the officers of
Saddam’s army were almost entirely Sunni Arabs.
This is not to say that Sunnis did not suffer too
under Saddam. Of course they did. But the treatment
and status of Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds were vastly
different in Saddam’s Iraq. The Kurds, for
example, were subjected to a campaign of ethnic
cleansing and genocide in the late 1980’s
that killed a large fraction of their population,
a tragedy that vastly overshadows anything that
happened to the Sunnis. The difference is that while
individual Sunnis suffered for opposing Saddam,
there was systematic and intentional persecution
of the Shia and Kurds as communities.
The main result of Bush’s adventure has been
to turn this on its head. The Shia and Kurds now
seem themselves as the masters of Iraq, and the
Sunnis are left with little. The insurgency, which
is Sunni-based, has not helped matters by assassinating
two of the Sunnis on the committee to write the
constitution, and murdering Sunni election workers.
The Kurds and Shia want two things. The first is
that they are able to form a federal Iraq in which
regions of the country run their own affairs on
almost all matters. In addition, they want the local
regions to control the oil revenue, rather than
the central government. As Iraq’s oil is found
only in Kurdish and Shia provinces, this leaves
the Sunnis left out of Iraq’s oil wealth.
The Kurds voted in the January election on a ballot
measure asking if they wanted full independence.
A stunning 98% voted yes. The Kurds will take the
first chance to leave Iraq, and the Sunnis feel
that if the Kurds leave so will the Shia. They oppose
the federal system and the oil revenue policy because
it opens the door to this path.
But with only 20% of the population, and with the
ongoing insurgency that is killing hundreds of Shia
every month, the Sunnis are backed into a corner.
What can they offer to the Kurds and Shia at this
point? There is no sense of “Iraqi”
nationhood to build on. Saddam destroyed all that.
If I were Kurdish I would want nothing to do with
Iraq. Unless the insurgency halts, the current dynamic
is heading toward a breakup of Iraq. It will not
be the first multi-ethnic state that could not be
held together without ruthless force. Not what Bush
planned, but human events cannot be planned with
certainty. Comments can reach me at Nali@socal.rr.com.
