Aziz, the PML,
and 2007
Musharraf’s
patched together political setup is heading for
a critical moment. Elections are due no later than
October 2007, and his position as President is contingent
on those elections yielding a National Assembly
that will reelect him to another five years. Already
the United States has declared that they want the
2007 polls to meet international standards of a
free election, standards that the 2002 vote fell
short of.
But to win a parliamentary election, Musharraf needs
a political party that will be able to garner votes,
and someone to head that party that can win the
confidence of the Pakistani voters. The current
PML-Q, which is Musharraf’s cobbled together
party of various lifelong opportunistic politicians,
is in disarray. Recent sniping between former Prime
Minister Jamali and party President Chaudhry Shujaat
Hussain along with attacks on Hussain by other figures
in the PML have highlighted this and attracted the
usual media figures to pronounce that the end is
near again. The absence of Shaukat Aziz, the Prime
Minister, from this recent spat seems to suggest
that he has no real control of the party of that
he would be leading into the next election.
All of these observations are essentially true.
Musharraf and Aziz have a major political problem
that needs to be dealt with, namely, that Aziz must
become a politician and not just a Prime Minister
in his own right. There are still two years to the
elections, which is a lifetime in politics, so much
can change between now and then. Who was Bill Clinton
in 1990 or Bush the younger in 1998? Vladimir Putin
was a nobody in Russian politics two years before
he became President. Aziz has very large advantages,
namely the fact that he has been a national figure
since 1999, he is the Prime Minister, and his policies
have been extremely successful.
For Aziz to win a free election in 2007, Musharraf
needs to make a strategic choice to enable his civilian
Prime Minister to develop real political standing.
Such a choice would have real consequences for the
civil-military relationship in Pakistan. Whether
Musharraf will accept this as the best way to solidify
the achievements of his government is unclear.
Can Aziz win in 2007? Pakistan in 2007 will be a
far different place than Pakistan in the 1990’s
was. The rise of mass communication, satellite TV,
increasing literacy, and cell phone penetration
(half of Pakistani households should have cell phones
by then) will change the way politics has been practiced.
An election strategy that focuses on television
and mass media rather than mass rallies and feudal
favors can win the cities. Could we not see a debate
on Geo TV between Aziz, Benazir, Nawaz, and Fazlur
Rehman? Aziz would make mincemeat of them.
Aziz could also build support from the business
community, the industrial workforce, the banking
sector, the stock brokers, the small farmers, and
the Mohajir, Shia, and minorities. Aziz could easily
run on a slogan of “Are you better off than
five years ago?” and every Pakistani with
a cell phone in her hand, or a new motorbike, or
TV set, would say “yes”. An Aziz ticket
could sweep the large cities, the free peasantry
in Punjab, and the minority votes.
There is more than sufficient time to pursue such
a strategy, but it is not unlimited. If Musharraf
wants to continue basing his government on the uniform
and assorted political hacks, while letting Aziz
the technocrat manage Pakistan’s growing economy,
that might be a short-term solution. But in the
long run, he is better off in transferring real
authority to the National Assembly, and in Aziz
he has a man who can ensure the continuation of
the progress that has been made.
There still remains the fundamental issue of the
power of the Presidency. For Pakistan to be a real
democracy, the President must be reduced to a ceremonial
role only, or if not the office should then be directly
elected by the people. This constitutional challenge
cannot be ignored by supporters of democracy.
Comments can reach me at Nali@socal.rr.com.
