Pakistan and
Israel
In the last month, Pakistan
has taken two highly visible steps to engage Israel,
with the possibility of diplomatic recognition floated
by President Musharraf himself. What has brought
Pakistan to this point, and why now?
In late 1947 and early 1948, when Britain was preparing
to withdraw from Palestine, the early Pakistani
government clearly made its pro-Palestinian sympathies
known. Jinnah was clearly a supporter of the Palestinians,
and was not in favor of the partition of Palestine
and the creation of Israel. Since 1949, the Pakistani
government has been consistently friendly to the
Arab cause and has avoided recognition of Israel.
The main reason for Pakistan’s stand has been
its loyalty as a Muslim country to fellow Muslims.
The Palestinians, who are 90% Muslim, and the other
Muslim neighbors of Israel, all pressed Pakistan
to side with them in international diplomacy. That
Pakistan did willingly. But Nehru and the Congress
party in India were also pro-Arab and pro-Palestinian.
As such, India too did not recognize Israel for
several decades.
Despite the formal diplomatic rejection of Israel,
there were ongoing relations between Pakistan and
Israel in the last few decades. Primarily these
occurred in the 1980’s, when Israel supplied
arms to Pakistan for use by the Mujahideen in Afghanistan
who were fighting the Soviets. These deals were
obviously at the behest of the US, which wanted
to put as much pressure as possible on the Soviets,
but never to publicly claim direct US involvement.
When the Afghan war ended, Israel and Pakistan resumed
their arms-length posture. But in the last fifteen
years, events have pushed Pakistani strategic thinking
to reassess relations with Israel. First was the
start of the Oslo process. If Arafat could shake
hands with the Israeli Prime Minister and hold direct
talks, then why should Pakistan feel constrained
not to? Must Pakistan be more Palestinian than the
Palestinians themselves? Even the neighboring Arab
states that have warred with Israel engaged in direct
contact. Both Egypt and Jordan had full peace treaties,
while Syria almost made a deal in 1999.
The second factor was the BJP turn to Israel. The
Indian government recognized Israel in 1992, but
when the BJP took power in 1997, the relationship
took on a strategic and military dimension. Both
Israel and India perceived a common enemy in Islam,
and so it made sense for them to make common cause.
Most ominously, Israel began to supply high-tech
military equipment to India, including an AWACS
system that substantially upgraded the capability
of India’s air force. In modern war, technology
trumps sheer numbers or zeal. Whichever side has
access to better technology will easily win a conventional
war. Pakistan began to see this Indo-Israeli alliance
as a significant threat.
Last year, the notion of recognizing Israel was
floated by the government. But it was essentially
rejected in the press and among the population.
The government backed down but did not change its
mind. The key event this year was the Israeli withdrawal
from Gaza. With that significant step, Musharraf
had an opening. He could now argue that Israel has
shown its willingness to act positively, and it
is in Pakistan’s interest to engage the Israelis.
Only through engagement can Pakistan push the Israelis
to complete the process of withdrawal.
Israel does not usually accede to threats, especially
the empty kind that the Arabs have usually delivered,
but it is susceptible to positive inducement. If
the Israelis believe that they can benefit from
certain acts, they will consider them. Linking full
recognition of Israel by the leading Muslim nation,
and the only one with nuclear weapons, to the creation
of Palestine, is astute. Musharraf has created a
seat at the table of the Middle East diplomacy for
Pakistan. If he can advance Pakistan’s interests,
and the Palestinians, then this approach is not
a sell-out, but a wise shift in Pakistan’s
longstanding position.
