March
17, 2006
Bush’s
South Asian Visit
President
Bush’s four day visit to Afghanistan, India
and Pakistan in early March has inspired a lot of
comments not only in the media of the subcontinent
but all over the world. Its significance cannot
be overemphasized.
The landmark Indo-U.S. agreement on cooperation
in the production of nuclear energy, it is generally
felt , has taken India a step closer to being recognized
in the nuclear lexicon as the sixth nuclear power
with a strong claim on a Security Council seat and
as a strategic partner of the U.S, besides enhancing
the prospects of closer ties in economic, commercial
and I.T. sectors.
It has clearly been, after over three decades, a
watershed in the U.S. policy towards the subcontinent
holding no less significance than Nixon’s
visit to China in early 70s that caused a sea change
in U.S.-China relations. The outcome of the Bush
visit has naturally generated a feeling of euphoria
in the Indian media and the people at large. In
Pakistan, on the other hand, it has caused a sense
of hurt and disappointment. While India received
a warm hug from the U.S. President, Pakistan was
left out in the cold and given, at best, a pat on
the back. This despite the fact that the country
has been a perennial strategic partner of the U.S.
and has been not long ago acknowledged as “a
major non-NATO ally”.
Mr. Bush made it clear that India and Pakistan were
two different countries and had as such to be treated
differently. Pakistan held significance for the
U.S. in the context of the war on terrorism. Relations
with India called for consideration on a broader
spectrum.
The Indian economy has been racing at 8 per cent
growth and holds now for the U.S. corporations a
carrot of 300-million-middle-class market. Despite
the outsourcing outrage that has caused the transfer
of an enormous number of American jobs to India,
it is the American corporations that are already
cashing in. And for a Republican President, the
interests of corporations hold a premium.
There is a fly in the ointment. Would the Congress
endorse the Agreement, particularly as it has just
taken a negative stand on the Administration’s
deal with a UAE firm for administering six of the
U.S. ports? The ports deal worked against the interests
of the corporate sector, hence the objection leading
to the withdrawal of the UAE from the deal.. But,
the deal with India, as already pointed out, is
full of carrots for corporations. India offers a
lucrative market for defense products too. It spent
in 2004, some $7 billion on defense purchases. Hence,
it appears that the objections to the deal would
be talked out in the Congress.
A section of the U.S. media, however, has been strongly
critical of the deal. The N.Y. Times wrote two editorials,
an unusual occurrence, condemning the decision as
wrong-headed unless the White House was looking
at it as counterweight to China’s soaring
ascendancy. The paper has not elaborated this point,
but the concept of a balance of power would evidently
be anachronistic considering the compulsions of
globalism propelled by the U.S itself. Globilism
has already promoted mutually beneficial U.S-China
trade and investment. Major U.S. businesses would
be averse to a significant shift in the current
pattern. China is serving as their manufacturing
floor. For instance, WalMart alone imports goods
worth $25 billion from China at prices that can’t
be beaten by any other country.
The Chinese need peace for the foreseeable future
in order to maintain their high growth rate. That
country is thus determined to have a friendly neighborhood.
It has already smoothed out its differences with
its neighbors. Similar is the position of India.
It too needs peace for decades to come.
In its latest editorial (March 7) the N.Y. Times
labeled the very trip as “spectacularly misconceived”.
The deal, it argued, would “blast a bomb-size
loophole through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”,
weaken arguments against Iran’s nuclear adventure
and encourage North Korea to pursue its own project.
The trip has embarrassed, if it hasn’t alienated,
a tested friend –Pakistan- and its President,
whom Bush had only a few days earlier labeled “a
buddy”.
“Mr. Bush should have just stayed home”,
the N.Y. Times remarked.
Several other papers including Boston Globe, London
Economist, and Washington Post have similarly pointed
out the loopholes in the deal with India.
As a quid pro quo for the deal, the Indians would
be expected to withdraw from the Iran-Pakistan-India
gas pipeline project that is opposed to by the U.S.
because of its current anti-Iran stance. The cost/benefit
ratio of such a move would have to be worked out
by the Indian planners. The thirst for power by
the burgeoning Indian economy may not be quenched
by an increase in nuclear power; Iranian gas could
substantially supplement the energy supply.
The nuclear deal is unlikely to free the economy
from the shackles of sky-rocketing oil prices. India
already has 14 nuclear reactors, but their total
output is a mere 3 per cent of the country’s
total power generation. Even after the nuclear deal
and the freer supply of nuclear fuel, experts predict,
the power produced through this source may not exceed
25 per cent of the total by even 2050.
The greatest damage, or “collateral damage”,
that the Bush trip has caused is the strain that
has developed in relations between Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Both are US allies and committed to the
elimination of terrorism and should therefore logically
pull in he same direction, and they have actually
been doing that. So much so that while giving vent
to his annoyance over the Karzai allegation, he
disclosed that his support to the former had substantially
helped in his election as the President of Afghanistan.
Mr. Bush, on the other hand, had his own compulsions.
His popularity rating in polls had gone down to
the lowest –34 percent- at the time of his
trip to Asia. To restore the confidence of the people
in his government, he had to come up with something
spectacular. On his visit to Kabul, he is said to
have pressured Karzai to increase efforts to arrest
or eliminate the top leadership of Al Qaeda. Karzai
resorted to the excuse that his government had provided
intelligence to Pakistan on the whereabouts in that
country of Al Qaeda leadership but Pakistan had
failed to work on it.
On arrival in Islamabad, Mr. Bush therefore queried
Musharraf about this matter, and in a public statement
even referred to it, but added quickly that he was
convinced of the sincerity of Musharraf in the war
against terror. His demeanor, the absence of gusto,
and his prosaic, proforma statement conveyed a different
impression.
The outbursts of Musharraf in his interviews with
the CNN and senior Pakistani journalists, his sarcasm
towards Karzai and his Northern Alliance aides only
confirmed his hurt over the suspicisions that had
crept into his personal equation with President
Bush, owing chiefly to the maladroit handling of
the issue.
President Bush has sent Gen. Abizaid of Central
Command to control the damage and effect a rapprochement
between Karzai and Musharraf. Would he succeed?
One hopes so, but it is not free of doubt. If Musharraf
has to bow out, the alternative will be more army
-not a welcome development from Bush point of view
or the interest of the people of Pakistan at this
stage.
arifhussaini@hotmail.com March 9, 2006
