September
07, 2007
Pakistan: The Corruption Scenario
"Political
elite and their cronies continue to take kickbacks
at every opportunity. Hand in glove with corrupt
business people, they are trapping whole nations
in poverty and hampering sustainable development."
- Peter Eigen, Chairman, Transparency International:
August, 2002
When Gen. Musharraf took over power some eight years
back, the people at large welcomed him enthusiastically,
chiefly because he held out the promise of eradicating
the canker of corruption permeating the upper echelon
of the political elite.
The most endemic and entrenched manifestation of
poor governance, corruption had become virtually
a way of life in the country. Public exchequer had
been robbed dry by both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir
and the country was teetering at the brink of bankruptcy
so much so that it was being gleefully referred
to as a failed state by the hostile media of our
eastern neighbor. Transparency International too
had ranked Pakistan as the second most corrupt country
of the world.
By the time the army took over power in October
1999, corruption had become the norm and honesty
was but a joke. Plunder had acquired a seductive
logic of its own. The leadership of the country
had been finding it difficult to reconcile personal
with national interest or to differentiate between
personal and public funds.
The situation was quite different till the dismemberment
of Pakistan in December 1971. Even during the rule
of Z.A. Bhutto, corruption was not the norm. But,
it did mark the beginning of major kickbacks in
defense purchases, in the purchase of Mirage planes
for instance.
The foundation of bureaucratic corruption was laid
during Bhutto's period. His 1973 Constitution did
away with the chapter on civil services that guaranteed
security of service to civil servants. That chapter
had formed part of all pervious constitutions. By
removing that, Bhutto put the careers of all senior
civil servants at his personal pleasure. Summary
dismissal of some terrorized them all. The ensuing
insecurity and the enormous administrative and financial
powers at their disposal tempted them to seek security
in nest eggs acquired through illegal means. For
sheer survival, many turned into sycophants. Since
they knew the ropes, they guided the political bosses
into the ways and means of making money.
The nationalization of key industries and of banks
opened innumerable new portals of corruption for
the bureaucrats. They made a beeline for positions
in these nationalized institutions to suck them
dry. That is how the system of bad bank loans started.
Corruption, nepotism and incompetence became the
hallmarks of the alliance between the politicians
and the bureaucrats. The rule of law through institutions
yielded to governance by individuals through cabals
in which the bureaucrat became indistinguishable
from the politician. In this new dispensation, every
time a government changed, all crucial functionaries
from a TV news editor to Federal Secretary were
replaced by cronies of the new rulers.
A civil servant had to be either a friend of the
politician in power or of those in opposition. If
neither, he was irrelevant and disposable. This
subservience of the bureaucracy continues till today
as it has suited all political and military regimes.
During the so-called Decade of Democracy, the ranks
of public service were packed by men either by straight
nomination by politicians or by perverting the selection
process. Incompetence and corruption have thus come
to flow through the national stream.
Gen. Zia encouraged corruption to deflect any challenge
to his position. The Afghan war brought a lot of
foreign money and weapons into the country. Easy
access to weapons led to what is known now as the
Klashnikov culture. The abnormal conditions of the
war admitted of the production and export of narcotics.
A new breed, called drug barons, emerged on both
sides of the border.
Corruption kept spreading while the leader kept
chanting his mantra of Islamization. Army officers,
particularly of higher echelons, had their share
of the pie. Living within the legitimate means became
almost an offense.
Successive political regimes starting with Prime
Minister Junejo in 1985 and continuing till the
October '99 coup of Gen. Musharraf thrived on both
political and financial corruption. The two stints
each of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir took corruption
to levels that attracted international media attention.
Their scandals swelled to the sky. It was a total
descent into the abyss of corruption.
Considering the extent to which Pakistan's ruling
elite were littered with corrupt scoundrels, the
rounding up of loan defaulters, tax evaders and
abusers of public funds and other such rogues by
Musharraf government, were hailed by the public.
But the slow process evoked skepticism of the people
at large. Then came the dramatic disclosure of an
agreement with the Sharif family whereby its ill-gotten
wealth was surrendered to the government in return
for the permission to all members of the family
to go into exile in Saudi Arabia.
Full details of this deal have not been made public
giving rise to public cynicism about the intentions
of the army. Benazir, being a feudal lady, refused
to enter into any such plea-bargain and continued
to assert her innocence despite the mountain of
evidence against her. The army's role in handling
these two crooks has not been as transparent as
expected. Public cynicism in this respect is reinforced
by the past conduct of the army high command. For
instance, in 1988, the ISI was said to have got
Rs.140 million from Mehran Bank to distribute among
political parties favored by the army. Gen. Mirza
Aslam Beg, the Army chief at that time, has himself
confirmed this.
Gen. Musharraf is no Aslam Beg or Ziaul Haq. He
enjoys the reputation of being an honest and straightforward
person. Over the past 7 1/2 years of his rule, no
evidence to the contrary has surfaced. But, the
low turnout at his referendum and his decision to
go ahead with the formation of the National Security
Council despite the vast opposition to the concept,
give rise to many a question. His era is marked
by the split of the society into two distinct segments:
one comprising the men in uniform (the rulers) and
the other the civilian second strings (the minions).
All earlier military rulers - Ayub, Yahya, and Zia
- had wisely absorbed into their ruling setups substantial
civilians both politicians and bureaucrats. They
came down heavily on civil servants found to be
corrupt or incompetent but they did not replace
them wholesale with officers in uniform as has been
done during Musharraf's time.
Granted that he needed a team that he could totally
rely on to run the administration. But, did he need
such a large team?
Another relevant development has been the whittling
down of the once all-powerful CSP cadre, known now
as the DMG. Their jobs as District Commissioners
have been given to the elected Nazims.
Perhaps the setting up of the National Security
Council, the transfer of powers to Nazims, and the
induction of so many men in uniform into civilian
positions, are meant to ensure the continued retention
of power by the army. This unchecked concentration
of power in the hands of persons belonging to a
particular sector of the society has tempted them
to feather their own nests.
One has to view the prospects of the success of
the deal between Benazir and Musharraf for the sharing
of power against the above background. It would
be quite natural to question the possibility of
the odd couple to keep scratching each other’s
back for long. Even a meek and noble Prime Minister
like Junejo was thrown out by the “God-fearing”
and ostensibly self-effacing President Zia in a
clash of personalities. Would the hubris and narcissistic
traits of both Musharraf and Benazir admit of the
deal working for long?
- Arifhussaini@hotmail.com
