Deal, No Deal,
or Many Deals
September
07, 2007
The rapidly
changing political situation in Pakistan took
another turn when the Supreme Court granted Nawaz
Sharif’s petition to revoke his exile status.
According to the court, he is free to return to
Pakistan at his choosing. However, a number of
legal cases against him would likely result in
his arrest upon return, so he is not home free
as of yet.
This does cloud the upcoming election picture
even more, and makes Musharraf’s calculations
even tougher. Clearly he has no friends at the
Supreme Court, and his hope of serving another
term as President and Chief of Army Staff simultaneously
is likely to be dashed against the emboldened
and independent Supreme Court. So Musharraf and
his team are looking to make a “deal”
that will allow him to retain significant power
in the next government. Conversely, many liberal
critics of Musharraf have been prodding him to
come to an understanding with the PPP and PML-N,
and allow Bhutto and/or Sharif to come back unrestricted
to run in the election. These pressures, combined
with the ambitions of both Bhutto and Sharif to
return to politics, are pushing the players to
make a “deal” that will allow civilian
democracy to strengthen in Pakistan.
But in reality, Pakistan’s politics needs
three distinct deals. The first, and most important,
is a “deal” between all the major
political parties in Pakistan to reshape the constitutional
framework of the government. There needs to be
several very important changes that will require
constitutional amendments. First is a change to
proportional representation rather than first
past the post system for electing MNAs. Currently,
whoever wins the most votes in each district wins
the seat, even if that person only gets 25% of
the vote. Given Pakistan’s highly fragmented
politics (there are over 60 political parties),
a single party that gets 30% of the vote in each
district will win a landslide in the National
Assembly. This happened in the 1997 election when
Nawaz Sharif won over a 2/3 majority while only
getting 35% of the cast votes. He used that majority
to make whimsical changes to the Constitution.
Second, all major offices should have 10-year
term limits, with the clock starting fresh now.
This includes Prime Minister and President. Third,
either the President must be returned to a ceremonial
post, or the office should be directly elected
by the people, otherwise Pakistan cannot really
be a democracy. Fourth, the ban on “floor-crossing”,
which required every MNA to vote only as instructed
by the leader of their party and makes a mockery
of democracy, must be removed. Finally, the method
by which the Constitution is amended must be made
much more difficult and deliberate. The addition
of reserved seats for women and the degree requirement
for MNAs should be retained.
The second deal is between the army as an institution
and the politicians. There needs to be an understanding
by which the army submits to civilian rule, while
the civilians reassure the army that they will
not be punished or gutted as an institution, and
that their legitimate input in foreign policy,
relations with India and the US, and domestic
security will be solicited and respected. Musharraf
obviously must play a role in this deal.
Finally, there needs to be a deal between Musharraf
and Bhutto/Sharif. This deal needs two elements.
First is the terms and conditions by which Musharraf
would pardon both of them for previous crimes
and thereby release them from the cloud of corruption
cases that he uses to threaten them with arrest.
This deal should also clarify the mechanisms by
which we can ensure a free and fair election.
The second element is a specific political deal
by which Musharraf retains the Presidency, while
Bhutto becomes Prime Minister and shares power.
This Musharraf/Bhutto deal actually should not
be entered into before the election. The parameters
of this deal should be negotiated on the basis
of the relative electoral performances of Musharraf
and Bhutto supporters. Only when the size of each
party in the next National Assembly is known can
the relative balance of power-sharing between
Musharraf and Bhutto really be settled. In fact,
it would likely be a major error for Benazir to
be seen as enabling Musharraf to retain power
at this stage. It will cost her votes, and would
allow her opponents to attack her for being a
Musharraf stooge.
Pakistan is reaching a critical stage in its political
development. For the first time we have seen the
real pillars of democracy asserting themselves,
namely the judiciary and the press. If they continue
to do their part, the future looks bright. But
democracy needs more than that. A Musharraf/Bhutto
deal is only the final step in the transition.
Several other critical deals need to be made first.
Comments can reach me at Nali@socal.rr.com
