May 01, 2009

 

The Taliban Phenomenon

 

Who are these “Taliban”, these students of religious seminaries (madrassas), who emerged from nowhere in the autumn of 1994, laid down books, picked up arms and turned into a mysterious army that went on capturing village after village, city after city, province after province, till they had under their writ over eighty percent of war-torn Afghanistan? Interestingly enough, they kept advancing without notable resistance and their ranks kept expanding as the erstwhile freedom fighters belonging to different political groups and even the former communists voluntarily joined them.

Various countries within and without the region viewed this phenomenon from their narrow, nationalistic viewpoint. Iran, for instance, saw it as the creation of the “Great Satan”, the US, to keep the influence of Iran and Russia away from Afghanistan. The Indians projected it as the creation of Pakistan to serve as the breeding ground for the export of “Islamic terrorism” to Kashmir and elsewhere.

A book, The Taliban Phenomenon, published in 1999 by the Oxford University Press, Karachi, presents a well-documented account of this development and its implications. Written by Lt.Gen (Retired) Kamal Matinuddin, it is a valuable work on the advent of Taliban in Afghanistan .

The author’s long military career in Pakistan army has enabled him to have a clearer grasp of the military aspects of the problem. His diplomatic assignments, including that of Ambassador to Thailand, and his research works as head of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, have further sharpened the subtlety of his intellect and his facility with the modern tools of research. This is his fourth book.

As for the origin of the Taliban movement, the author points out that various factions of the Afghan freedom fighters (mujahideen) had been unable to arrive at a consensus regarding the political shape of things in the post-Soviet era. The Western powers abruptly left them to their own devices. A continuous fight for power ensued among them. Fifty thousand Afghans were killed in this struggle for power between the militias of Hikmetyar and Rabbani alone.

People had grown disgusted with their leaders who had been making and breaking alliances overnight. They did not respect even the agreement signed by them in the precincts of holy Kaaba. Several erstwhile commanders, being well armed, had turned into gangsters, indulging in corruption, robberies, murders, drug trafficking and rapes.

A young Jihad veteran, Mullah Omar from Kandahar who had gone back to his school following the withdrawal of Soviet forces, saw a Herati family looted, raped and killed at a checkpoint north of Kandahar by local mujahideen turned bandits. This was revolting for him as it was totally against the Islamic teachings he had been nurtured on in his school. On his call, some other Taliban, products of similar crucibles, flocked to him and the movement was born.

Mullah Omar, 48, is a towering 6 ft 6 inches, muscular Pushtun with a flowing black beard. He was injured four times during the war against the Soviets and had lost an eye in combat. He refuses to have an artificial eye, an aversion perhaps to cosmetics.

The war-weary people joined en mass the movement that promised them security from the self-appointed, self-seeking warlords. They had no weapons, but a well-wisher opened his armory to them. This was their first acquisition of arms. Several war veterans had joined their ranks who could handle weapons and train others. They captured an arms and ammunition dump of Hikmatyar. Afghan war veterans and former communists who were in Afghan armed forces also joined the Taliban. Many were well-trained pilots, artillerymen and tank crews.

Taliban leaders led an austere life that contrasted conspicuously with the luxurious lifestyle of the warlords. Their usual tactic, when closing on the opposition, was to send some of their representatives with the Taliban flag in one hand and the Qur’an in the other. They would approach the opposing militia fighters and ask them to lay down their arms as the Taliban had come to restore peace and end all fighting. In most cases their message was accepted, particularly as the Taliban constituted a neutral force with ostensibly no hidden agenda.

Usually they took control of cities without a shot being fired. City after city came into their fold and their stock of arms and ammunition kept mounting. The internecine, fratricidal war in these areas came to an end. This set an example for the war-tired people of the other cities to follow. The process continued till eighty per cent of the country came under their sway.

On the other hand, President Rabbani, Gen. Dostum of the Uzbek militia and commander Ahmad Shah Masood of Panjsher valley, joined hands in northern Afghanistan to stem the tide of the Taliban. Moral and material support was extended to them reportedly by India and Iran. Indian support evidently emanated from its desire to have a finger in the pie apart from an interest in Central Asian oil and gas. The Iranian stance was based on the fact that 14 percent of the Afghans were Shias and most of them lived in the northern provinces. Iran also has a stake in the oil and gas of the region. It wanted the pipelines to go through its territory to the outlets on the Persian Gulf.

Pakistan ’s objectives, ever since the power struggle among rival Afghan militia began, have been: Durable peace in the war-ravaged land; a friendly government across its western border; repatriation of Afghan refugees on Pakistan soil; access to Central Asian markets; and a safe route for the oil and gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to the Arabian Sea.

Turkmenistan ’s Karakorum desert is believed to hold the third largest gas reserves in the world, some three trillion cubic meters, and has estimated oil reserves of six billion barrels. The shortest route to the open sea from Turkmenistan is through Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The oil discoveries, next only to Saudi Arabia in quantities, in the Caspian Sea region have also added to the scramble for access to the reserves by Iran, Turkey, Russia, China, and the US apart from the regional states. Peace and stability in Afghanistan is a pre-requisite for the oil and gas projects to be carried out.

Pakistan had expended its resources and energies for a decade in fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Its fight against poverty, the prime national objective, had to take a secondary place. The country’s enormous debt, defense spending, and the consequent economic mess are in no small measure a legacy of that war. The Soviet Union collapsed: Pakistan too is groggy.

Generally, the people of Pakistan do not share the extremist obscurantism of the Taliban. The middle class intelligentsia of the country, having been exposed to modern education and having always played a leading role in identifying the preferred path for the country, looks with disdain at the fanaticism of the Taliban.

The Taliban could gain popularity and consolidate their hold in the country of their origin because of the general disgust in the country towards the life of crime and impiety of the warlords. Taliban’s conduct during the hijacked Indian airplane’s halt in Kandahar and their own plane’s hijacking to a British airport had earned them praise from various quarters. From that lofty ground, the Taliban have gradually fallen into the abyss of butchers. A video released recently probably by them shows a bunch of them beheading some alleged spies.

The author of the book, Gen. Matinuddin, has correctly pointed out that, with ninety per cent illiteracy, a fiercely independent nature, a fickle and mercurial temperament, and a strong grip on them of the semi-literate mullahs, the Afghans “fell victim to their own dogmatic beliefs.” This coupled with the easy availability of weapons made it difficult for them to develop a consensus as to a stable political dispensation.

The Western occupation of their land after 9/11 could hardly pacify these volatile, freedom-loving and rugged people. If anything, they have overflowed into Pakistan territories causing havoc there now.

Although a number of well-researched books on the Taliban have appeared on the shelves since Gen. Matinuddun’s primary work - for instance, the works of Ahmad Rashid, Hasan Abbas, and Dr. Syed Amjad Hussain - one would be well-advised to start with the book under review. It would be a good investment of time.

(The writer may be reached by e-mail at arifhussaini@hotmail.comor by phone at 714-921-9634)