July 31, 2009
Sanger’s Book Holds Special Significance for Pakistanis
David E. Sanger’s book “The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts”, published early this year, holds a special interest for Pakistani students of affairs particularly the formulators and practitioners of the country’s foreign policies.
Sanger , NY Times’ chief correspondent in Washington, explores in this voluminous critique of the eight-year Bush administration, its failures and the colossal problems left behind for Obama to tackle. But, his account is nuclear arms centric. While allocating almost half of the book to Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan, he has conspicuously ignored the developments affecting US interests in Africa, South America, Mexico and even Russia. As a seasoned and polished reporter, he has concentrated on presenting the facts and letting the reader draw his own conclusions. His focus on the nuclear threat from the anti-Israel clerics of Iran and the fear of Pak-Afghan Taliban fanatics acquiring access to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is perhaps calculated to give a clear message to the Obama administration.
The book is valuable in that several accounts are based on the author’s interviews with the VIPs concerned. American and foreign dignitaries talked with candor to Sanger and he has disclosed these for the first time in the book. In this category falls, for instance, his account of the meeting with Khalid Kidwai, head of the Strategic Plans Division, who keeps the country’s nuclear keys and contends that if Pakistan can make nuclear weapons, it can also make them safe. In the same category comes the account of Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former CIA officer who helped crack A.Q. Khan’s network.
Sanger has given a lot of space to Iran’s surreptitious nuclear projects. He has unveiled many facts that had not been in common knowledge. For instance, the secret information of Iranian plans on the hard disc of a stolen laptop computer, the information gathered secretly from sources having access to Mohsen Fakrizadeh, Iran’s chief of the nuclear project. More elaborate are the details as to how A.Q. Khan’s network was busted through the Tinner family of Switzerland, which had played a key role in providing technical information to Mr. Khan and his clients. Fascinating details are also given of how the CIA operatives succeeded in arranging the supply of defective centrifuges to Iran that kept exploding and causing disruptions in the enrichment of uranium process. The sabotage included the supply of unstable power that destroyed the centrifuges. Also given is account of how US operatives tunneled into Iran’s computer systems and obtained extensive information.
These covert measures delayed the timetable of Iran but led to no agreement on Iran giving up the project. The International Atomic Energy Agency had no concrete evidence that Iran was producing weapons-grade uranium. And, the US National Intelligence Estimates for 2007 mentioned that Iran had suspended its weapons project in 2003.
Sanger points out the folly of Bush administration in rejecting the request of Israel for permission to fly over Iraq to bomb Iran’s Nantanz and other nuclear sites as had been done earlier with the sites in Iraq and Syria. Bush couldn’t authorize this as the US was already mired militarily in Iraq and it could hardly afford to indulge in another unpopular war.
For direct diplomacy, the most suitable time was 2005-2006. Iran had a small number of centrifuges and its economy was adversely affected by the falling oil prices. But, Bush was in no mood for a dialogue with a bunch of clerics. “At the moment when we most needed to act like a truly enlightened superpower, we let fear trump judgment, we depleted our political capital and moral authority, and we sullied our reputation….”
The Bush administration’s total focus on Iraq distracted the attention that needed to be given to Iran. That country is said to have already set up since then an assembly of over 4000 centrifuges that may produce within a year’s time enough enriched uranium for a bomb.
Incidentally, the on-going agitation against the re-election of Ahmadinejad is being presented by the ruling clerics as the handiwork of CIA’s agent provocateurs to bring about a regime change.
The central theme in Sanger’s book is the havoc caused by the shortsighted policy of Bush of concentrating all efforts on Iraq that distracted attention from other trouble spots – Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Korea and China.
Following 9/11 when Afghanistan was invaded by the US, Al Qaeda and Taliban were never defeated and eliminated; they simply moved to the East and South, the normal tactic of guerilla fighters. Many crossed the porous border and regrouped in the difficult border terrain.
The “coalition of the wiling” had a different perception about their assignment in Afghanistan. They (NATO forces) “had come to Afghanistan chiefly to provide political cover, not covering fire.” While Bush was proclaiming that “freedom was on the march in Afghanistan,” the situation on the ground presented a different picture. Even the sympathetic Afghans were increasingly disillusioned that the expected Marshal Plan for socio-economic uplift of the country was nowhere in sight. Enormous amounts were being poured into Iraq (over $800 billion) but only rhetoric was served to Afghanistan. The state’s annual revenue under Karzai watch was less than a billion dollars. Poppy production increased consequently to $4 billion and 93% of world output. It became an existential issue for the Afghans concerned. Also, it financed the insurgency.
The unemployed youth kept joining the ranks of the militant Taliban. These militants discovered that “their greatest weapon was not the car bomb or the roadside IED, the improvised explosive devices that caused devastating injuries. Instead, it was
American tentativeness, an unwillingness by Bush or other officials to commit troops, money, and resources for the years, if not decades it would take to rebuild the country”.
Many in the Administration were convinced of the need to change course. But, for Bush it would have amounted to an acceptance of his folly. So, he preferred to remain under the delusion that Al Qaeda and Taliban should be defeated in Iraq to spread peace in the region. For every six soldiers in Iraq, one was stationed in Afghanistan. “Bush’s successors will be dealing for years with the consequences of massive misjudgment in Afghanistan.” Bush’s proclivity to solve all problems through the barrel of the gun instead of across the table negotiations and effective measures for economic uplift turned the problems into nightmares. The war-torn Afghanistan became the fifth poorest country of the world with life expectancy of forty-three years and illiteracy dominating the populace.
The chapter on Pakistan carries a lot of interesting information. A plausible account is given of how A.Q.Khan managed to set up his black market nuclear network, how Khalid Kidwai, chief of the Strategic Plans Division, charged with the responsibility of securing Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was carrying out his assignment. The Division was provided by the US financial aid of $100 million, apart from technical advice and trainings. Yet, Pakistan’s ability to control its arsenal “ranks among the least understood, least discussed, and in many ways the scariest nuclear challenges” facing President Obama. The efforts to “secure the weapons has been undercut by mutual distrust”. … “For all the public talk about democracy and development, about the need to foster moderation in Pakistani society, in the end it is the security of that arsenal that captivates Washington’s attention.
The author contends that Pakistan, with all its inherent and current weaknesses, “remains one anarchic turn away from spinning out of control.” When that happens, the radical elements would get the chance to lay their hands on the nuclear material to be used against Israel and the US.
The US policy, one is led to surmise, should therefore concentrate on measures that would preclude such a possibility. The title of the chapter on Pakistan reads: “How Do You Invade An Ally?”
arifhussaini@hotmail.com
