Significance of Pak Army Offensive in S. Waziristan
Barring unintended consequences, the army operation launched on October 17 in South Waziristan, the epicenter of the behemoth called Taliban, will in all probability succeed in defeating the militants, demolishing their hideouts and establishing the writ of the government in the harsh and lawless region now under the virtual domination of the militants (jihadists). This view is prompted by the success of the army’s offensive five months back in Swat valley to clear the tourist hub of the ill-informed, fanatic and rabble-rousing mullahs and their followers, thus bringing the area into the mainstream of a peace-loving, forward-looking society.
Much more noteworthy is the discernible change in the mindset of the higher echelon of the army towards the Taliban who were spawned by their ace spy agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), nurtured by them, and who paved their way to power following the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Pakistan was one of the only three countries, which recognized the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Even after the dramatic shift in policy towards the Taliban following the “you-are-with-us-or-against-us” pressure of the US, Pakistan’s civil and military leadership retained a soft corner for the Taliban. The resultant equivocal policy towards them and the growing anti-Americanism among the people owing to the aggressive and arrogant stance of Bush regime, were perhaps instrumental in he expansion of the militant (jihadi) groups in the country, in Southern Punjab in particular, and the hypocritical official condemnation of the Taliban.
The military was paid about $1 billion by way of reimbursement of its expenses on the fight against terror/Taliban. “Do more” became the burden of the US song.
The chess game underwent a sea change with the victory of Barrack Obama in the US and the emergence of Asif Ali Zardari as the leader and President of Pakistan. Mr. Zardari aligned himself closely with the US on the approach to Taliban who were suspected of having assassinated his wife. He failed to snatch the ISI from the Ministry of Defense and give it to the Ministry of Interior headed by his friend, Rehman Malik. Similarly, he couldn’t follow through on his offer to India to enter into an agreement on ‘no first use of nuclear weapon’ against each other, as it amounted to unilaterally abdicating the equalizer available to Pak army.
It has taken the army four months, since its success in Swat, to launch the offensive in South Waziristan. Why the delay, particularly as the civilian leadership and the US authorities had been pressing for immediate action? The delay was not due to any heavy-footedness of the army command. Several factors contributed to it. It was likely to turn out the toughest campaign for the army. The military had been bombarding the strongholds of the Taliban to soften their defense, while deploying troops to blockade the region and trying to win over factions among various groups.
Matter of fact, the area is heavily defended by the militants. It is larger than Swat, and much more inaccessible and volatile. The people have always been hostile to outsiders unlike Swat, which was once a tourist paradise giving rise to a culture of consideration to foreigners.
The army had to preclude the possibility of its actions drawing into the conflict the militants based in the entire Waziri belt. They included al-Qaeda affiliate Sirajuddin Haqqani network, which has a peace agreement with the army. The activities of these militant groups are crucial, according to some analysts, to the army’s perceived interests in South Asia.
Another reason may well have been the Kerry-Lugar bill, on the anvil then, that promised $1.5 billion annually for five years for Pakistan’s socio-economic development. The bill, signed by the US President only a day before the army offensive, provides for an unprecedented chance to the civilian government to expand its clout at the expense of the army. For instance, it underlines the need of civilian oversight on all senior postings and promotions. It wants the defense budget to be debated in the parliament instead of the current one-line allocation. Naturally, these went against the military’s vested interest and it vehemently opposed such provisions. It had to manifest once again that only the army had the means to deliver what the US wanted. Ideologically, the Obama administration is committed to the solution of all international disputes through debate and discussion, instead of a resort to the gun. He was rewarded the Nobel Peace Prize mainly for that reason. It is another matter that in the case of Pakistan, it benefits a leader heavily weighed down by his baggage of corruption and crime.
The dizzying pace at which militants have struck at targets, mainly of security significance, over the preceding couple of weeks had increased pressure on the army to deal with its erstwhile protégés. Public opinion too has diametrically shifted against the terrorists owing to the spate of their brutal attacks killings.
The string of terrorist attacks began with the suicide attack on October 5 on the UN Food Program office in Islamabad killing five staffers. Then came the attack on a market in Peshawar killing 53. But the most brazen attack was by a band of 10 militants on the military headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi on October 10. It took the lives of nine militants and 11 security personnel including a Brigadier and a Lt.Colonel. The attack on the GHQ was like an attack on Pentagon. It raised serious questions about the government’s watch and guard machinery. Two days later, on Oct. 12, a car bomb aimed at a military convoy in Shangla, just outside Swat, killed 40 persons.
Another two days later, on October 14, came coordinated attacks by teams of Taliban gunmen on three prominent law enforcement facilities in Lahore: FIA’s provincial headquarters, Manawan Police Training School, and Elite Police Headquarters.
The attacks showed a desperate attempt to terrorize the people and pressure the government to halt the projected operation in South Waziristan. They have also underlined the Taliban’s reach, network and ability to carry out coordinated strikes at will with amazing speed and skill. That the teams’ mastermind was a Punjabi ex-soldier, and the teams included several militants from Southern Punjab, underlined the fact that the militants are ideology-based and not linked to racial or ethnic groups. This is the most significant point in any analysis of the likely outcome of the conflict.
In the army’s earlier three operations in South Waziristan in 2004, 2005, and 2008, it preferred to enter into truce instead of a fight to finish. This was perhaps motivated by the surreptitious aim of using the ferocious fanatics in a South Asian conflict. The fanatics are programmed to be loyal to their ideological moorings and not to a secular organization like the army. So, they have turned against the man in uniform. Because of their ill-advised recent ventures, the Taliban have lost public support, but if they can bog down the army in the severe winter cold, their success will regain public support.
The situation right now is fraught with uncertainties. If the army forges ahead at a fast clip, as planned, and achieves its objective before severe winter sets in, it would be hailed by the nation for a job well done.
Meanwhile, an intensive campaign need must be launched by the government to inform the people what kind of faulty ideas the fanatics entertain, and how far removed from the basic precepts of their religion the Taliban version is. A grave responsibility in this respect rests with the vast corps of religious scholars who can communicate their own conviction about the follies of the fanatics. Saadi, poet of the East, says:
Du cheez tira-i-aqil ast, dam fro bastan
Ba vaqat-i-guftan, va guftan ba vaqat-i-Khamushi
(Two things reflect the darkness in the mind of a person:
saying something when he should keep quiet, and keeping quiet when he has to speak.)
This is the time to speak from conviction.
- arifhussaini@hotmail.com
