November
23, 2007
Will Musharraf’s
Errors Prove Fatal?
General Pervez
Musharraf plunged Pakistan into a deep political
crisis when he declared a state of emergency early
this month. This move, which was essentially a
“coup” against the very government
structures he had set up, allowed him to pack
up the troublesome Supreme Court that was going
to derail his deal with Benazir Bhutto.
He had himself re-elected by the current National
Assembly, and was willing to allow free elections
in January confident that he did not need a favorable
outcome to hold onto the Presidency for another
five years. But this deal was undone when wiretaps
by the ISI found out that the Supreme Court was
set to rule his re-election invalid and unconstitutional.
Musharraf concluded the only way to hold power
was to dismiss the current Supreme Court, which
resulted in the state of emergency. He then compounded
that error by passing a law making civilians subject
to military courts and a new set of rules to restrict
the media.
Needless to say, these acts have not enhanced
his popularity in Pakistan or abroad. Currently
there are demonstrations in the cities, the lawyers
are challenging the government, and the politicians
are trying to make as much out of the situation
as possible. But for all the smoke, there is not
yet much fire. The vast majority of Pakistanis
are sitting this conflict out so far. And in the
critical heart of Punjab, Lahore and Islamabad,
the general population remains on the sidelines.
As long as this is true Musharraf will somehow
manage to retain power, but in a weakened state,
with a Vice-Chief of Army Staff now appointed
as his successor, Benazir Bhutto back in the country,
and a media and judiciary that have an adversarial
view toward the government.
A year ago, Musharraf seemed to be in a very strong
position. His approval ratings in private polls
were consistently about 60% for the last several
years, and were well ahead of Benazir and Nawaz.
But Musharraf made a huge error in mapping out
a successful strategy to transition his system
through an election. Although he was Chief of
Army Staff, his political power rested on his
being President, along with the National Assembly
being under the control of his allies in the PML-Q
and the MQM. He needed to make a fundamental choice.
Did he want to force the system through the election
through rigging and a compliant Supreme Court,
or was he willing to “play by the rules”
and win power in 2007 fair and square at the ballot
box?
The huge error that Musharraf made was not taking
the latter road. It would have required a deliberate
choice to be made two full years ago to elevate
Shaukat Aziz into a political figure. This may
have tweaked the nose of Chaudhry Shujaat but
he would not have any option but to go along.
Aziz could have run a campaign based on the real
achievements of the last five years, and attacked
the other parties for their mis-governance and
corruption. They could have fully utilized the
new media outlets and private TV channels to reach
voters.
Opinion polls gave Musharraf a huge lead in 2006,
and well into 2007. It was only after he tried
to force out the Chief Justice that Musharraf’s
popularity tumbled, and now remains around 20%.
Now Musharraf finds himself criticized on all
sides. But at this point, it seems unlikely that
he can be forced from power in the short term.
As long as the army is behind him and the bulk
of Pakistanis are not against him enough to demonstrate,
he can ride out this storm. The United States
wants Pakistan to have elections, but it even
more wants Musharraf to stay in power. It is hoping
it can get both, even if the elections are less
than perfect.
The only good news in this mess is that the religious
parties and Nawaz Sharif (who is an Islamist at
heart) have not been heard much. In fact, it looks
like the Saudis have got Nawaz incommunicado till
after the elections. The big fear of the West,
of an Islamic revolution giving Qazi Hussain Ahmed
control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, looks
next to impossible as an outcome.
The current turmoil is a direct consequence of
the changing expectations of Pakistan’s
growing middle-class. This group owes its existence
and prosperity to the success of Musharraf’s
policies. It is a shame that he failed to make
its members his allies and has turned them into
his enemies. Comments can reach me at Nali@socal.rr.com.
