June 10, 2011
Was Pakistan Helping bin Laden?
After the deeply embarrassing turn of events that led to bin Laden’s death in a villa in Pakistan, there has been global speculation about how much responsibility falls on Pakistan for bin Laden’s 10 years on the run.
For many, it is impossible to believe that bin Laden could have remained hidden in Abbottabad for the last six years without out active help from the Pakistani government. But what is the truth?
On the face of it, the evidence against Pakistan is fairly compelling. Bin Laden was hiding quite successfully in a town full of senior military officers, just down the street from a major military academy. He was living in a large compound, with high walls and barbed wire. It is known that Pakistan was supporting a number of other militant and extremist groups over the years, including Lashkar e Taiba and the Afghan Taliban. Bin Laden did not seem too concerned that he would be found by security forces.
But it is not quite so clear-cut. Although he was hiding in Abbottabad, he certainly did not act like someone enjoying local welcome and immunity. He never ventured out of the house, nor showed his face through any window. The house was cut off from the outside with no telephone line or Internet connection. He communicated via courier and flash drives used to send and receive emails from Internet cafes. He was clearly taking extreme precautions to hide his presence and identity.
In the last few months before the US attack, the CIA had apparently rented a nearby house to observe and monitor the bin Laden compound. During that entire period there is no report that Pakistani officials or military officers ventured into the compound, or that any contact was made between the bin Laden couriers who lived there and a Pakistani official. If Pakistan was actively assisting and hiding bin Laden one would think something like that would have happened. Since the raid, the US has obtained a treasure of computer files, hard drives, and flash drives and other items that were taken. If there was any real alliance between bin Laden and Pakistan, there should be some smoking guns in there, but so far there has been none. In fact, there is one document apparently that hints at a scheme by bin Laden to obtain protection from Pakistan in exchange for a pledge not to attack the country, but this idea went nowhere, and suggests that no alliance actually existed.
Another matter to consider is bin Laden’s own suspicion of any Pakistani official. How certain could he be of being kept hidden if he revealed himself to the ISI? Once even a few members of the ISI knew his exact location, leaks would spread the news to a wider circle. The 25 million dollar price on his head would have been a very strong inducement for someone to turn him in. If there was knowledge of bin Laden’s hideout in the ISI, it would almost certainly have leaked over the last six years. Bin Laden would have been very foolish to trust his security to the ISI. There is certainly no evidence that senior Pakistani military or civilian leaders knew of bin Laden’s whereabouts. If he had been hidden by Pakistan, the conspiracy would have to have spanned Musharraf and the civilian leaders and the new Chief of Army Staff General Kayani. All of them would have to know the truth, and be willing to carry on the dangerous game. All of them would have been well aware that if it became known that Pakistan was hiding bin Laden, the outrage of the US would be extreme, and certainly the entire US aid package and international support would be jeopardized. It is hard to imagine that this was in fact the case.
So why is there this strong suspicion of Pakistan on the one hand, and the strong denial by Pakistanis on the other? It comes from the double game that Pakistan has played since 9/11. Pakistan had no problem going after Al-Qaeda, meaning the foreign jihadi fighters, mostly Arabs and Central Asians, who were brought together by bin Laden to carry out global jihad. Pakistan has captured or killed hundreds of them, and almost all of the senior Al-Qaeda operatives that have been taken down were tracked down by Pakistan. The Pakistani military has no use for Al-Qaeda and does not support it or bin Laden. But when it comes to the Afghan Taliban, it’s a different story. Pakistan insists on Afghanistan being ruled by a government friendly to Pakistan and hostile to India. It sees the current government not fitting that bill, and so has continued to support the Taliban in their ongoing attempt to maintain influence in Afghanistan. This creates a highly contradictory policy of supporting the US mission in Afghanistan while also supporting the Taliban fighting the US. It also means that Pakistan has dragged its feet on cracking down on Taliban-linked militants within Pakistan, resulting in the tragic events in Swat and Bajaur and South Waziristan over the last 2-3 years, and yet Pakistan continues to suffer from terrorist violence.
While Pakistanis distinguished between good militants like the Taliban, and bad militants like Al-Qaeda, to the US it looked like Pakistan was supporting the bad guys, so it must be also supporting bin Laden.
Pakistan was not hiding or helping bin Laden. But its failure to end militancy, its ongoing support of the Taliban, and its misguided foreign policy are real problems. Afghanistan will naturally be far more tied to Pakistan than India as a result of culture, geography, and religion resulting in significant economic and transport links that will greatly benefit Pakistan. The planned Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan gas pipeline is just one example of what is to come. But it makes no sense to pursue that pipeline while arming and supporting a group that will try to blow itself up on a regular basis. Comments can reach me at Nali@socal.rr.com
