December 16 , 2011
The Failure of Pakistan’s Afghan Policy
The NATO strike that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers has let loose a firestorm of protest and criticism in Pakistan. The transit links that supply the bulk of NATO and US forces in Afghanistan through Karachi were closed, and the Pakistani army has gone so far as to call the attack deliberate, rather than suggest it was a mistake. Pakistan also canceled its attendance of the Bonn Conference on the future of Afghanistan. And Pakistan has declined to participate in the NATO investigation into how the incident happened. Among the average Pakistani, and in the media and the army establishment, this event is proof of how untrustworthy the US is, and how Pakistan is the real victim in the Afghan conflict. But the truth is much less comforting; Pakistan is reaping the harvest of ten years of misguided policy in Afghanistan.
It is rather immaterial actually how the incident happened. Currently it appears that NATO forces were engaged in a local firefight with Taliban forces, they called in air support, and struck the Pakistani army camp thinking it was Taliban. There appears to be some claim on NATO’s part that they had cleared with Pakistani Army liaison that there were no Pakistani forces in the area, which obviously was not the real situation.
The real cause of this strike is that an Afghan insurgency continues 10 years after 9/11, and that insurgency requires the US to maintain large and active military forces along the Pakistani border. The reason why this Afghan insurgency has lasted for 10 years, and shows no signs of abating, is that Pakistan has been supporting it all along. It is in Pakistan where the leaders of this Taliban movement can gather freely, can plan and train, can raise funds and gather weapons, and can rest and treat their wounded. It is in Pakistan that they can recruit new soldiers, obtain intelligence, and avoid US Special Forces raids. Without the support of Pakistan the Taliban movement would wither away. It has no natural base within Afghanistan, it is confined to a faction of the Pashtun population only, and even most Pashtuns do not want another decade of war. So why does Pakistan support this movement?
Pakistan continues to see Afghanistan as a potential base and partner for its enemy India. To avoid Indian dominance of Afghanistan is a basic goal of Pakistani policy. Unfortunately, the Pakistani Army thinks that goal can only be achieved by installing a Pashtun-based Taliban government that is ultimately indebted to and dependent on Pakistan in Kabul. This of course is a fantasy based on the events of the mid-90s, and the Pakistani policy of pursuing it has led Pakistan to a dead end.
In the 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union left the Afghan Communist government vulnerable. It eventually fell to an alliance of northern-based groups that left the Pashtuns out in the cold. This touched off a civil war that lasted from1992 to 1995, when the Taliban swept aside the remnants of the Northern Alliance with help from the ISI and took power. The Pakistani army believes that the US will also eventually abandon Kabul, and the Taliban will repeat their 1995 triumph. This is fantasyland.
An Afghan central government that can command a 400,000 strong army, cannot be defeated by Taliban guerrillas. The Communist Afghans held on to power from 1989 to 1992 without Soviet troops as long as they had ammunition, cash, and supplies delivered. Even if the US leaves in 2014, it will still send Kabul 4 billion dollars a year in aid to keep its army in the field, which is much less than the 100 billion a year the US is spending now. US airpower and drones will also be available for another decade, and it is likely that the US will leave 10,000 permanent soldiers to act as a rapid reaction force. The Taliban can do small terror attacks, but if they ever tried to gather 5000 soldiers in one place to assault a town, they would be decimated. The Kabul government is permanent, and some ragtag Taliban with ISI backing are not going to overrun Kabul with a fleet of Toyotas with machine guns like 1995.
Meanwhile, India has just won a major concession to develop large-scale iron ore mines in Afghanistan. With their stupidity, the Pakistani generals are pushing Afghanistan into India’s embrace. What about the road not taken? What if Pakistan had clearly seen which way the world was headed and worked to stabilize and develop Afghanistan, given up on the Taliban, and developed strong and deep economic and trade and transport links between Afghanistan and Pakistan?
Is alienating Pakistan’s most powerful ally, and the supplier of its most advanced weapons, really a good strategic plan? Is getting most Americans to think negatively of Pakistan the best way to maintain a balanced US policy between Pakistan and India, and the best way to encourage investment in Pakistan? What about the price paid in Pakistan as a result of the blind eye turned toward the Taliban? How did Pakistan get its own Taliban movement anyway, one that for a while took over Swat and has killed thousands with its terror attacks? When will the generals and their supporters in the right-wing media and among the sympathetic politicians ever learn?
Comments can reach me at Nali@socal.rr.com.
