January 13, 2011

Pakistan Society in the Cleft of a Conflict

 

 

The crux of the problem of Pakistani polity lies in the dichotomy between the rulers and the ruled. While the gap has kept narrowing in both India and Bangladesh, it has been widening and solidifying in Pakistan. The governments of the neighboring countries have been responsive to the aspirations of the people, who in their turn have reposed trust in governments elected by them. Both societies have been marching forward, socially and economically, over the past decade or two, at an enviable pace.

In the first three decades since independence, Pakistan too had registered a laudable economic growth rate, perhaps the highest in South Asia. Its progress in the social sector was also quite impressive. What went wrong, then? One has to look into the historical factors.

The British left behind in the subcontinent a tradition of dual forms of governance – the authoritarian (Viceregal) and the parliamentary.

The areas that constitute Pakistan now came under the British Raj a century or so after the annexation of eastern, southern and north central areas of India. While the liberal values of British education and rule were taking roots in UP, Bengal, Bombay, CP and Madras, etc. and the people were getting accustomed to the rule of law, justice and the tolerance of dissent, bulk of North-Western India continued to be under the authoritarian rule of Raja Ranjeet Singh, aka ‘Sikha Shahi, till its annexation by the East India Company in 1849 – over ninety years after the fall of Bengal to the British in the Battle of Plassey (1757).

The British found in the North-West a strong tradition of rule by dictat and command, and therefore an incredible respect for authority. The Viceregal system of rule was thus found suitable for the area. The process of decision-making followed in this area was largely in the descending order, while in the other areas it was in the ascending order.

Debate and discussion of an issue was allowed in the ascending process to commence at the desk of a subordinate official and to continue upwards even to the level of the Viceroy. The decision thus taken reflected the cumulative intellect of the concerned functionaries.

The officers and staff who had opted to serve in Pakistan brought this system to Karachi from New Delhi. It remained in operation till the entire process was subjected to the authoritarian system by the Martial Law regime of Ayub Khan.

“Democracy does not suit the genius of the people”, he proclaimed. But being a moderate person and a product of the British system, he reverted within four years to a constitutional government, normal operation of the rule of law and the process of debate and discussion. His effective advisers were outstanding civil servants nurtured on the ascending order of decision-making. His ten-year rule therefore witnessed laudable progress in all socio-economic sectors.

The first major jolt to the system, particularly to the economy, was given by Z. A. Bhutto, who had emerged as a populist leader; but, on the assumption of power, he elected to don the mantel of a Martial Law Administrator. Under the protective shield of Martial Law, he nationalized all major industries in the name of socialism blunting their competitive edge on the world market. More importantly, he destroyed by this measure the political clout of the growing urban-based industrialists. The ensuing vacuum served as a political windfall to the rural aristocracy, the feudal lords, Bhutto’s own caste.

Himself a narcissist feudal lord and a dyed-in-the wool autocrat, he exploited the pent-up emotions of the downtrodden people calling them “the fountainhead of all power”. He rode to power on this very slogan. The credulous people believed him. Despite this hypocrisy, history would not fail to credit him with causing an awakening among the people. And, the people reciprocated by electing twice his corrupt and incompetent daughter to power.

Had he practiced what he preached, Pakistan would not be in the sorry state that it is now. According to the latest State Bank report, the economy has suffered an abysmal fall during the watch of Zardari, his son-in-law.

Bhutto had the best opportunity after the fall of Dacca to cut the warrior caste to its proper size. It was ready to accept the surgery to make up for the disgraceful surrender. Instead of cutting it down by at least half, as the defense of the Eastern wing was no longer the responsibility of the rump state, he fired a few "fat and flabby" Generals but increased three-fold the defense spending! He selected a junior, meek and ostensibly submissive General, Ziaul Haq, as his army chief and thought that he had thereby strengthened his control over the army.

This was the greatest folly of Bhutto. Instead of strengthening the civil polity, he opened the official largesse to the warrior caste and enlarged it beyond the possibility of control by civilian authority. He had to pay with his life for this aberration from his populist posture. His feudal and autocratic proclivity overrode his commitment to the common people. The ray of dignity and respect in the life of the common man disappeared!!

The nation was thrown back to the autocratic Sikha Shahi period. A nominated Majlis-i-Shura or a parliament drawn through non-party elections, were Zia’s facades for the military dictatorship.

Zia served as the American surrogate in the Afghan war that ensured his continuance in the seat of power for 12 long years. Economy, education and other national issues of real significance were put on the back burners. The fallout of the war in the form of Klashnikov culture, smuggling, heroin abuse and the onslaught of 3.5 million Afghan refugees, etc. were brushed under the carpet. These became big headaches for all subsequent governments.

The US ensured that Zia’s attention was not diverted from the Afghan arena. IMF, World Bank and the Paris Club were made to dole out, on occasions, more loans than what Zia’s minions requested. No wonder, external debt shot up during his period from $5 billion to $18 billion.

Unfortunately, he was too self-serving, too obsequious, to even mention to his masters to write off the debt for the sacrifices of his nation. Egypt got this done at the time of the Camp David Accord.

When Zia left, the economy had already entered the debt trap. From then onwards efforts concentrated on borrowing more and more to pay the due installments and the interest on earlier debts, fund the ever increasing demands of armed forces, and cover the gap even in the revenue budget.

Puny civilian leaders – Junejo, Benazir and Nawaz Sharif - had neither the vision nor the courage to take unpleasant decisions to rectify the situation. Instead of going to the people to inspire them for the needed sacrifices, they turned for support to the feudal elite. The country came to be dominated by the feudal spirit: arrogance, self-aggrandizement, and finding a way out of any problem through harassment or by lining the pockets of concerned high officials.

Nawaz Sharif’s release from jail and exile in Saudi Arabia provide convincing evidence of his family’s expertise in using money to achieve their objectives.

Born and raised in the feudal environment, Benazir was unwilling to return to the nation her ill-gotten wealth or defend her innocence in a court of law. The miasma of her and her husband’s corruption permeated the society - it still does! During her two stints, she did throw some crumbs to the minions of the PPP but did little for the common weal, particularly by removing the distortions in the basic structure of power. Like the Shakespearean old lady “she protesteth too much” against the domination of the man in uniform, but failed to take any step to rectify the situation. She leaned too much against the US for support, like her husband now suspected to be behind the Memogate’s servile offerings to the US.

Musharraf’s rule for almost a decade was marked by stability, both administrative and economic, but it strengthened further the suzerainty of the army and did little to do way with the hold of feudal families. He could have launched the Kalabag Dam project to meet the country’s ever-increasing power demands, particularly as he enjoyed dictatorial powers.

He did replace the centrally controlled Deputy Commissioners’ system with elected Nazims that would have in the long run reduced the chasm between the rulers and the ruled.

The elected administration of Zardari has gone back to the old system by erasing the system of elected Nazims. Directly on coming into power, he removed also the condition of college degree for membership of the parliament. Both were retrogressive moves. A good percentage of the elected representatives hail from feudal families who are as much for status quo as are the men in uniform.

Currently the two are in a severe conflict over which sector - civil or military - should hold suzerainty over the other. The Memogate is an ill conceived manifestation of it. While the two contenders keep fighting, the economy keeps sliding downward and the so-called common man keeps dying proportionately.

Would the man throw off decades of docility and stand up to fight for a place under the sun? Events in 2012 may give a glimpse of the shape of things to come. One has to hang on to hope even in a dismal environ.

The writer may be reached by e-mail at arifsyedhussaini@gmail.com or by phone at: 714-921-9634