January 03, 2020
The Verdict on Musharraf
By Nayyer Ali MD
Last week, a special court convened to hear the treason case against General Pervez Musharraf finally issued its ruling five years after the trial began. Musharraf, who took power in 1999 in a military coup and ruled Pakistan till 2008, was found guilty of treason and sentenced to death.
This ruling by the court, the first time a Pakistani court has ruled a general guilty of treason for seizing power, is a watershed moment in the political evolution of Pakistan. It makes clear what many observers have noted, that the era of military coups in Pakistan is permanently over, and that democracy and civilian government is the only path forward.
But is Musharraf in fact a traitor? Does he deserve the death penalty, and even worse, the public desecration of his corpse that was called for by one of the three judges in his ruling? That is a more complex question.
When Musharraf seized power in 1999, Nawaz Sharif, who was Prime Minister, was in the process of destroying democracy and setting himself up as a civilian dictator. He had already hounded his principal opponent, Benazir Bhutto, out of the country, he had set his goons on the Supreme Court where they physically assaulted the Chief Justice for pursuing corruption cases against Sharif, and was in the process of amending the Constitution of Pakistan to have himself declared “Amir-ul-Momineen” with essentially dictatorial powers. Meanwhile, his corrupt rule had severely damaged the economy, and he had muzzled the press. When Musharraf seized power in a bloodless coup, he was seen as saving the country. All the other political parties supported his action, and Bhutto’s PPP even handed out sweets in celebration.
Over the next nine years, Musharraf oversaw the best stretch of economic growth and development in Pakistan’s history. Living standards rose sharply, cell phones became commonplace, exports doubled, debt was cut down to size, and indicators of health and education rose. There was a massive expansion of higher education, and a new media landscape with multiple cable channels came into existence. The press was freer under Musharraf than it had been under Sharif. Musharraf also navigated the consequences of 9/11 and the US overthrow of the Taliban deftly and in a way that protected Pakistan from geopolitical isolation.
By 2007 however, Musharraf was facing increasing calls for the hybrid military-civilian system he was using to run the country to give way to real democracy. This would mean that he would have to give up his status of Chief of Army Staff if he wished to remain Pakistan’s civilian President, and he would have to allow a fair election to determine the next Prime Minister. Musharraf failed to handle this crisis correctly. He tried to force the Supreme Court to allow him to hold on to his Army status while being Pakistan’s President. He ultimately made a terrible decision to suspend the Constitution a second time in November 2007 and force the judges to swear an oath to a second Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) that would allow him to do what he wanted. This failed as most senior judges in Pakistan refused to comply, and public opinion swung sharply against him. In the end, Musharraf resigned as Chief of Army Staff later that month, but remained President. He reinstated the constitution in December, and held elections in February that put the PPP in power. Benazir Bhutto however had been assassinated by the Taliban so her widow, Asif Zardari, took her place.
The current court case was over whether Musharraf committed treason with his PCO order in November 2007. It was not about his original coup in 1999, but of the two actions, the 1999 coup was technically speaking more illegal. Why should he be declared a traitor and sentenced to death over his brief and failed attempt to retain power in November 2007, and yet no criticism or case is leveled at him for his 1999 coup?
While the legal issues are more complex than they first appear, the political implications are more significant. This ruling makes clear to the military that the time of coup d’etats is over. A Pakistani general who seizes power will ultimately lose it and be found a traitor by the Supreme Court. Coups can only work if the judiciary and the politicians go along with it, which is what happened in the 1950’s and 1970’s and 1990’s. They are now saying that will not happen again.
This is a big step forward for Pakistan’s political evolution. Many critics of the current situation still feel that the military is the real power in Pakistan, and it used its power to get the courts to invalidate Nawaz Sharif on corruption charges, and to tilt the playing field to allow Imran Khan to win the election in 2018. In this view, the courts and the Imran Khan government are puppets of the military who retain real control. This view is completely wrong. While the military supported the court’s actions against Nawaz Sharif, and clearly wanted Imran Khan to win in 2018, they do not control either of them. Currently, Pakistan is a hybrid system with multiple power centers, including the army, the judiciary, and the elected government. Their interests overlapped in 2018, but they are still independent of each other. The next step in Pakistan’s evolution is for a civilian government to do an effective job of running the country. If Imran Khan can do that, he can gradually assert true civilian supremacy over the military. This will take another 5-10 years.
